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This dissertation investigates empirically the consequences of recent fiscal 
policy changes on China’s rural development. It uses a county-level dataset covering 
over 90 percent of rural counties and a period of 13 years since 1993, in which China 
started to experience a series of fiscal reforms to decentralize government 
expenditures and authority to local governments.   
 After a brief introduction in the first chapter, the second chapter assesses the 
dynamic changes in GDP and fiscal resource distributions from 1993 to 2005. In 
particular, it focuses on how the coastal-inland gap, the between-province gap, and the 
gap between poor and non-poor counties contribute to the growth of inequality by 
devising a decomposition approach in a multi-tier hierarchical economy. It is shown 
that the inland gap between poor and non-poor is larger than the coastal gap in GDP, 
but smaller in public spending. This suggests that fiscal equalization policies, though 
effective in equalizing public service provision, failed to equalize income in inland 
areas.  
The third chapter explores the incentive mechanism of intergovernmental 
grants. It brings a single-threshold linear-spline model to the data of 2002 and reveals 
a non-linear relationship between grants and recipients’ local revenues. The finding 
supports the argument that grants, though increasingly used as a policy device to 
reduce fiscal disparity, have produced an anti-equalization effect favorable to urban 
 recipients with larger revenues and induced rent-seeking in rural recipients with less 
revenues. 
The fourth chapter assesses the extent to which county level governments 
compete for capital investment and the determinants of their behavior. It initiates an 
approach using Moran’s I statistics to investigate tax competition behavior between 
units that are both geographically connected and relatively small in size. Contrary to 
the regression approach, it finds tax competition behavior is not globally uniform. 
Instead, counties with favorable endowment in coastal areas tend to race to the bottom 
by lowering tax rates, while counties within a poorly endowed neighborhood in 
interior areas have a greater propensity to run a ‘race to the top tax rate’. This result 
predicts a trend toward polarization, which may challenge the convergence view in 
growth economics.  
  
 
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Yi Yao was born in Tianjin China in 1975. In 1998, she graduated from Nankai 
University in Tianjin, with an honor in International Economics and Business. In 
2000, she went to the United States to start a would-be eight-year study abroad. In 
2002, she received a Master of Arts in Economics from the University of Hawaii at 
Manoa. The same year, she began the Ph.D. program at Cornell in the Department of 
Applied Economics and Management. Her daughter, Yuning, was born in 2007. One 
year later, she made two achievements: finishing the final draft of her dissertation and 
teaching the little toddler to walk by herself.  
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my parents, husband and daughter 
谨以此文献给我的父亲母亲，亲爱的女儿及老公
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I’m deeply indebted to my thesis advisor, Ravi Kanbur, who generously offered his 
time to discuss every idea I had and constantly provided me with support during the 
last five years. This dissertation benefits tremendously from attending conferences, 
seminars and class presentations he organized at Cornell and IFPRI. I am also grateful 
to Xiaobo Zhang for serving as the outside member in my special committee. He is the 
best co-author I can find for enlightening me on brilliant thoughts and guiding me over 
proper methods. His enthusiasm over China study has become an imperishable source 
of my courage to meet challenges in doing this research.     
I also thank Yongmiao Hong and David Just for serving in my special committee and 
for their comments on the early draft of this thesis.  To Nancy Chau, I am thankful 
for her timely presence at my B-exam. To Shenggen Fan, I am thankful for his 
frequent guidance and discussion over this thesis. To Christine Raney, Deborah 
Campbell and many other professors and friends at Cornell, I appreciate for their 
contributions to making my life at Cornell easier and even happier.  
 I gratefully acknowledge the financial support that I received from the Division of 
Governance and Strategy at IFPRI, the Department of Applied Economics and 
Management at Cornell, the Graduate School of Cornell, and the Gregory and Paula 
Chow Best Paper Award.      
Finally, nowhere would I go if without the support of my dearest family. I thank mom 
and dad for their unconditional support and warmest love, thank my husband Yu for 
his patience and efforts that have made the physical distance between US and China 
almost invisible to our marriage, thank my lovely daughter Yuning for the pleasures 
and meanings she added to my life, and thank my parents-in-law for always giving me 
a hand when most needed.    
 vi  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Biographical sketch .......................................................................................................iii 
Dedication....…..............................................................................................................iv 
Acknowledgements.........................................................................................................v 
Table of contents............................................................................................................vi 
List of tables................................................................................................................viii 
List of figures.................................................................................................................ix 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................1 
Bibliography ...........................................................................................................6 
2 Evolution of Income and Fiscal Disparity in Rural China  ...................................7 
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................7 
2.2 Data and methodology..................................................................................10 
2.2.1 Data...................................................................................................10 
2.2.2 Inequality measures ..........................................................................14 
2.3 Income distribution from 1993 to 2005........................................................15 
2.3.1 Overall inequality .............................................................................15 
2.3.2 Contributions of between-group inequalities at the second tier .......18 
2.3.3 Contributions of between-group inequalities at the third tier...........20 
2.4 Fiscal distribution in 1993-2005...................................................................22 
2.4.1 Redistribution through fiscal policies...............................................22 
2.4.2 Fiscal equalization over time............................................................24 
2.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................32 
Bibliography .........................................................................................................34 
Appendix : Data....................................................................................................35 
3 Equalizing or not? Assessing the Intergovernmental Grants and their Incentive 
Effects in China’s Fiscal Reform  .......................................................................36 
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................36 
3.2 China’s grant system ....................................................................................40 
3.2.1 The central government’s grant policy.............................................41 
3.2.2 Grant structures and the decision power of sub-national governments
 ……………………………………………………………………...43 
3.3 Methodology.................................................................................................47 
3.3.1 Specification .....................................................................................47 
3.3.2 Estimation.........................................................................................50 
3.3.3 Specification tests.............................................................................51 
3.3.4 Testing for endogeneity....................................................................52 
3.3.5 Testing for sample partition..............................................................53 
3.4 Data and empirical results ............................................................................54 
3.4.1 Data...................................................................................................54 
3.4.2 Non-parametric evidence for non-linearity ......................................55 
3.4.3 Estimation.........................................................................................56 
3.4.4 Tests of sample partition ..................................................................61 
3.4.5 Tests of nonlinearity and specification.............................................62 
 vii  
3.4.6 Endogeneity test ...............................................................................64 
3.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................67 
Bibliography .........................................................................................................70 
4 Race to the Top and Race to the Bottom: Tax Competition in Rural China      
 …………………………………………………………………………...73 
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................73 
4.2 Rethinking the measure of tax competition..................................................76 
4.2.1 A simple capital-flow model for tax competition.............................76 
4.2.2 Empirical tests for tax competition...................................................79 
4.3 The existence and pattern of tax competition behaviors ..............................82 
4.3.1 Data...................................................................................................82 
4.3.2 Identification of local spatial tax competition ..................................84 
4.3.3 Spatial and temporal changes ...........................................................85 
4.3.4 Endowments .....................................................................................87 
4.4 The choice model of tax competition strategy .............................................89 
4.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................99 
Bibliography .......................................................................................................103 
 
 viii  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 2.1  Sample description .............................................................................................12 
 2.2  Evolution of income distribution at different levels...........................................16 
 2.3  Evolution of the distribution of public spending (service) at different levels ....25 
 2.4  Evolution of the distribution of tax revenues at different levels ........................26 
 3.1   Summaries of fiscal, economic and demographic variables for grant recipients in 
2002 ....................................................................................................................49 
 3.2   Parametric regressions for rural counties ...........................................................57 
 3.3  Parametric regressions for urban counties..........................................................58 
 3.4  Parametric regressions on pooled data ...............................................................59 
 3.5  Wald tests of sample partition by urbanization ..................................................62 
 3.6  Bootstrap tests of polynomial grant functions against spline grant function .....63 
 3.7  Bootstrap tests of single knot spline against other splines .................................64 
 3.8  Grant allocation functions for rural counties......................................................65 
 4.1  Distribution of tax competition strategies in the nation, regions and endowment 
clustering groups ................................................................................................86 
 4.2  The chi-square test of independence for tax competition choices and spatial 
location variables................................................................................................86 
 4.3  Summaries for tax strategy choices and the explanatory variables ....................91 
 4.4  Multinomial logistic estimates for the tax strategy choice.................................93 
 4.5  Tests for factors that support choosing the L-L over H-H tax strategies ...........95 
 
 
 ix  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 2.1  Data structure for poor and non-poor counties.................................................13 
 2.2  Comparison of the Gini and  Theil index for within-nation inequality of GDP
..........................................................................................................................16 
 2.3  Evolution of GINI inequality at the national level ...........................................18 
 2.4  Contributions of between-group inequalities to overall inequality: GDP........19 
 2.5  Comparison of between-province inequalities in coastal and inland regions: 
GDP ..................................................................................................................21 
 2.6  Comparison of coastal and inland gaps between poor and non-poor counties:  
GDP ..................................................................................................................21 
 2.7  Contributions of between-group inequalities to the overall inequality: public 
spending............................................................................................................29 
 2.8  Comparison of between-province inequalities in coastal and inland regions: 
public spending.................................................................................................29 
 2.9  Comparison of coastal and inland gaps between poor and non-poor counties: 
public spending.................................................................................................29 
 2.10  Contributions of between-group inequalities to the overall inequality: fiscal 
revenues............................................................................................................30 
 2.11  Comparison of between-province inequalities in coastal and inland regions: 
fiscal revenues ..................................................................................................30 
 2.12  Comparison of coastal and inland gaps between poor and non-poor counties: 
fiscal revenues ..................................................................................................30 
 3.1   Composition of grants received by counties in 2002 .......................................46 
 3.2  Comparison of grant structure in rural and urban counties: 2002 ....................46 
 3.3   Local polynomial regression of grants on local revenues ...............................56 
 3.4  Rural grant-revenue relationship ......................................................................67 
 4.1  Dynamic patterns of county-level tax rates: GINI and mean in the nation ......83 
 4.2  Tax strategy distribution among 2094 rural counties in China ........................85 
 4.3  The impact of agriculture share in GDP on tax competition behaviors ...........97 
 4.4  The impact of government employment size on tax competition behaviors....98 
 
 
 
 
 1  
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
In the last decade, China has experienced a steady and rapid economic growth 
in terms of national GDP; however, many studies (Chen and Ravallion 1996, Kanbur 
and Zhang 1999, 2005, Yang 1999, Knight and Song 2001, Démurger et al. 2002) 
show that the aggregate growth has yet to contribute to a balanced income distribution 
among regions and rural urban areas.  
          Among many factors that cause or affect this unequal growth process, the role 
of institutions or governance is especially critical in China. Since the 1980s, China has 
engaged in a series of reforms of its old fiscal system, which include the fiscal 
contracting reform in 1983, the tax sharing reform in 1994 and other minor policy 
adjustments. A basic characteristic of these reforms is the devolving of fiscal authority 
in revenue collection and public spending to local governments, which can serve to 
create and stimulate local incentives that promote economic growth. The earlier 
studies on the impact of the fiscal decentralization process in China, however, have 
produced controversial results. On the one hand, Jin et al. (2005) find that fiscal 
decentralization in China can function as a mechanism for preserving market 
incentives and therefore lead to equal development. On the other hand, many other 
studies (West and Wong 1995, Lin and Liu 2000, Knight and Song 2001, Cai and 
Treisman 2005) agree that fiscal decentralization is negatively related to equality. 
Because most of the existing studies use data up to the early 1990s, they cannot 
overcome the bias inherent in a short-term analysis, nor can they document the 
consequences of the most recent fiscal reforms.  
 This dissertation has two empirical advantages over the above studies. First, 
more recent data will be used to examine the fiscal decentralization process after 1994, 
which will be identified to possess a tendency toward fiscal equalization. Second, 
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while most studies use provincial data to evaluate the regional or national inequality, 
the county-level data we will use not only enable us to reexamine the distributional 
outcome at the more disaggregated level, but also provide an opportunity to extend the 
studies of development to the county-level. In China, the government structure 
consists of five levels including the central government, provinces, prefectures, 
counties and townships. Possibly due to data scarcity, studies on policy issues below 
the provincial level are very rare. However, the decentralization process, by its nature, 
highlights the power of local governance, especially the governance in a small 
territory. This suggests the importance of looking at the lower level governments in 
studying decentralization.   
 In short, this dissertation aims to use the most recent and disaggregated data to 
illustrate the new patterns of recent fiscal reforms in China and to reveal their potential 
impact on regional growth, income distribution and local governance.  
 The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to increase the understanding of the income 
and fiscal inequality trends during the post-fiscal-decentralization period. Using a 
dataset of 2094 rural counties in China, it describes dynamic changes in income, fiscal 
expenditure and tax revenue distributions over the period of 1993-2005. In particular, 
it focuses on how the coastal-inland gap, the between-province gap, and the gap 
between poor and non-poor counties contribute to the growth of inequality. In doing 
so, a decomposition approach based on the General Entropy (GE) class of measures is 
devised to assess the order of inter-group inequality’s contribution to the overall 
inequality in a multi-tier hierarchical economy. The major finding reveals that after a 
turning point, 1998, most income and fiscal inequality trends started to grow together, 
yet at different rates. The changes in these national inequalities, however, can better be 
explained by the changes in the between-province gap than by the coastal-inland and 
poor-and-non-poor gaps.  
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 From the observation of fiscal spending and revenue distributions, Chapter 2 
also derives important implications for fiscal equalization policies. On the one hand, 
the fact that the spending gap between the poor and non-poor rural counties is smaller 
in inland areas than in coastal areas indicates that the fiscal equalization policy 
functioned better in the inland.  On the other hand, the finding that inland areas still 
have a larger income gap between the poor and non-poor counties than coastal areas 
raises doubt about the effectiveness of the fiscal equalization policies in achieving the 
goal of poverty alleviation.      
 The results in Chapter 2 may raise concerns for the design of 
intergovernmental grants (transfers) in China. As responses, Chapter 3 reviews the 
structure of China’s intergovernmental grant system after the 1994 reform and 
conducts an empirical examination of how the grants were actually allocated among 
county recipients with different locally collected revenues. Using a comprehensive 
dataset of 2755 counties in 2002, both rural and urban, this chapter evaluates the 
recent grant policies from two major perspectives: the ultimate equalization effect and 
the disincentive effect.  
 First, while the conventional linear model finds no evidence for the equalizing 
effect, Hansen (1999)’s procedure is applied to estimate a single-threshold linear-
spline model, which reveals a significant equalizing effect of grants to rural counties 
with small local revenues yet a significant anti-equalizing effect of grants to urban 
ones with large local revenues.  The threshold model reflects a non-linear grant-
revenue relationship, which is theoretically consistent with the co-existence of 
grantors’ preferences for equality and preferences for investment return.  
 Second, robust results reveal an economically significant crowding-out effect 
of equalization grants, indicating that the grant seeking incentives, which reduce local 
revenues, can lead to weak incentive to promote growth and undermine the economic 
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efficiency of current grant policies. This disincentive effect, probably ignored in 
previous grant management, raises an important question to be answered by future 
studies: how can developing countries that comprise of regions with remarkable 
heterogeneity in economic and fiscal capabilities design an efficient government 
institution that will align local responsibilities with equity purposes? 
 One issue essential to fiscal decentralization is how to improve local 
accountabilities and therefore create competitive incentives among local governments. 
When it comes to the context of China, accountability may become a controversial 
issue. It is often argued that China’s centralized administration and top-down 
appointment system make local governments, provinces or counties, more responsible 
to their supervisors, the upper level governments. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the 
reforms of fiscal decentralization can work as well in making the local officials 
accountable to local needs. To shed some light on this question, chapter 4 turns to look 
at the degree of tax competition in rural China.           
Chapter 4 assesses the extent to which county level governments compete for 
capital investment and the determinant factors to their varied behaviors. It initiates an 
approach using the Moran’s I statistics, a spatial economics instrument, to investigate 
tax competition behaviors between units which are both geographically connected and 
relatively small in size. The results verify the existence of tax competition behaviors 
among rural counties. But, contrary to most empirical studies relying on the 
conventional regression approach, it is found that tax competition behaviors of rural 
counties are not globally uniform. Instead, robust evidence supports that counties in 
the coastal areas with favorable endowment tend to race to the bottom by lowering tax 
rates, while counties within a poorly endowed neighborhood in the interior region 
have a greater propensity to run a ‘race to the top tax rate’, implying that they are less 
disciplined by competition for mobile private capital.  
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The findings in Chapter 4 challenge the convergence theory in growth 
economics by casting a polarization picture for regions with sharp difference in initial 
endowment and fiscal capacity. More importantly, these findings reveal that current 
government structure and fiscal system still have problems that may prevent 
competitive incentives from spreading to poorly endowed counties.   
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Chapter 2  
Evolution of Income and Fiscal Disparity in Rural China1       
2.1 Introduction 
 During China’s transition from a planned economy to a market economy, 
economic inequality has increased sharply. In the span of just 12 years, 1983 to 1995, 
the Gini coefficient of household per capita income rose by 18.42 percent, from 38 to 
45 percent (Knight and Song, 2001). Among the many dimensions of inequality, rural-
urban and coastal-inland gaps have been widely examined in the inequality literature. 
For example, Kanbur and Zhang (1999), applying an inequality decomposition 
analysis to provincial consumption expenditures, find a rapidly growing contribution 
of the coast-inland gap to the overall inequality in the period of 1983-1995, and a 
profound, yet slightly decreasing, contribution of the rural-urban gap in the same 
period.   
 The purpose of this chapter is to enrich the understanding of the uneven growth 
trends in China by using a comprehensive and disaggregated dataset to examine the 
most recent changes in rural income and fiscal distribution patterns. Our study can add 
to the previous literature of growth and inequality in three ways. First, this study 
draws on a unique panel dataset which spans a twelve-year period, 1993-2005, and 
comprises 2094 rural counties, accounting for 79 percent of the national population in 
2005. Such a dataset ensures that the inequality patterns described in our chapter are 
more broad-based and precise. The county unit, less aggregated than the province, will 
allow the inequality calculation to take account of the intra-province inequality, 
thereby enabling us to correct for underestimation of overall inequalities. Using a 
county unit, however, is limited by being unable to capture the within-county 
inequality.  Knight and Song (2001) and many others explored the inequality measures 
                                                 
1 This chapter is co-authored with Shenggen Fan. 
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using the household unit. They overcame the disaggregate problem, but the use of the 
household unit, which requires costly and time-consuming data collection through 
surveys, restricted their analysis in both spatial and temporal dimensions. To our 
knowledge, no studies up to date have touched on the inequality issue by using such a 
widespread dataset consisting of county units. Among the few pioneers who employ 
county-level data to estimate inequality patterns, Tsui (1993) was restricted to a single 
year, 1982, and Park et al. (1996) carried out their fiscal disparity analysis in only two 
provinces. 
 The second contribution of this chapter is to provide deeper insights to the 
most recent evolution of the relative contribution of inequality among different 
hierarchical levels. To be specific, we examine the changes in the relative significance 
of between-province versus within-province inequality, between-region versus within-
region inequality, and between-the-poor-and-non-poor-group versus within-the-poor-
and-non-poor-group inequality. In doing so, this chapter extends the coastal-inland 
inequality study into the most recent period. While Kanbur and Zhang (1999) report 
that the contribution of coast-inland gaps to the overall rural inequality dramatically 
rose to 0.44 prior to 1994, our finding shows that it remained stable— between 0.2 and 
0.3—in the post-1994 period. The difference in the estimated level results might be 
attributed to the different datasets we have used; however, the slower growth rate in 
our result can imply that the coastal-inland divergence slowed down after its rapid 
growth in the early 90s.  
 It is worth noting that our study fills the blank left in other studies by 
expanding the inequality assessment into two new fields. Dividing the economy into 
high and low income groups according to the centrally designated poverty county 
criteria, we evaluate the dynamic changes in within-the-poor inequality, within-the-
non-poor inequality, and the gap between these two groups. The results thus provide a 
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unique foundation for assessing the general outcomes of poverty alleviation policies in 
the study period. Another new, and perhaps most important, attempt in this chapter is 
to extend the standard two-tier inequality decomposition approach into a three-tier or 
multi-tier hierarchical analytical framework. Such an attempt appears to have been 
worthwhile, because more interesting features of distribution patterns can be revealed. 
For example, our result bears out that the inland gap between poor and non-poor is 
wider than the coastal gap and deserves more serious attention—a point that hasn’t 
been raised by previous studies. 
 Lastly, this chapter also applies spatial inequality analysis to evaluate the 
distributional consequence of a nationwide fiscal reform in 1994. The reform, as 
shown in a later section, can cause mixed incentives of local officials, which in turn 
results in uneven management quality of local governments with different resource 
endowments, eventually leading to complex redistribution of fiscal resource.  To better 
understand the distributional consequence of the 1994 fiscal reform, we will address 
the following related questions. Has the reform equalized public good and service 
provision across different jurisdictions? How has the reform affected the availability 
and distribution of fiscal resources? What are the implications for future fiscal reform 
toward an equalizing growth?  
 The rest of this chapter starts with a brief introduction of the data and basic 
methodology in section 2.2. The trends of distributional patterns for county-level GDP 
will be presented and discussed in section 2.3. Then section 2.4 reports the results for 
county-level revenues and expenditures and interprets the implications for the ongoing 
fiscal reform. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter. 
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2.2 Data and methodology 
2.2.1 Data 
 The data for this chapter come from three sources. The major source is China 
Public Finance Statistics Materials for Prefectures, Cities and Counties 
(CPFSMPCC), which has been published annually by the China Ministry of Finance 
since 1993. This publication contains budgetary revenues, expenditures and their 
compositions for all the rural county-level administrative units, which are rural 
counties and county level municipalities, and reports the same information for urban 
units— namely districts in the city-level municipalities— but only in the years after 
1999. Also available from this source are the gross value of industrial and 
agricultural output (GVIAO), GDP and population. Considering that GVIAO, which 
includes the values of intermediate inputs, usually overestimates industrial incomes, 
we choose GDP2 as the primary measure of county level income.  
 CPFSMPCC reports county-level population only for a limited period of 1993 
to 2000. We extend the population coverage to 2005 by using the Social and 
Economic Statistics for Counties (SESC), a publication of the China Statistics 
Bureau. 
 Lastly, from the China Statistics Yearbook, we extract the annual price indices 
from 1980 to 2005. Price variation across provinces has been widely observed in 
China, especially since the 1990s. Following Kanbur and Zhang (1999), who argue 
that the price levels can be assumed identical across provinces in the early stage of 
China’s economic reform, we use the provincial rural CPIs with the common base of 
1980 as price deflators to net out the price effect in spatial and temporal dimensions. 
In the case of missing rural CPIs for certain provinces, the median of all the available 
provincial price deflators in the same year is used as a proxy.   
                                                 
2 Appendix describes details about how to cope with the problem of missing GDP.   
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 The observation units to be used in this chapter are the rural counties in 1993, 
including rural counties and county-level municipalities. Because of rapid 
urbanization process, China’s central administration annually upgrades a few rural 
counties to urban districts, and some county-level municipalities to prefecture-level 
cities.  Therefore, the total number of rural counties in China has dropped 
continuously from 2166 in 1993 to 2022 in 2005. To ensure a comprehensive 
coverage, we use the 1993 definition3.   
 We fix the sample of rural counties over the whole study period as a way to 
ensure dynamic comparability. In doing so, some rural counties with missing 
information are excluded from the study. For example, because CPFSMPCC only 
includes rural counties as of the current year for the period before 1999, the rural 
counties which were upgraded to urban districts before 1999 were missing between 
the year of upgrade and 1999. After dropping the rural counties with missing values, 
we arrive at a dataset of 2094 counties, representing 97 percent of the rural counties in 
1993. 
 The counties in our sample are further divided into provinces, coastal and 
inland regions, and poor and non-poor groups, according to their administrative 
connection, geographical location, and average income level respectively.  Table 2.1 
describes our sample coverage and group formation. Indicated by  Table 2.1, our 
sample covers the whole nation’s 79.47 percent of population. The coastal region in 
our sample, which includes 12 provinces—Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan, has 
647 rural counties representing 75.43 percent of the coastal population, while the 
numbers for the inland region are 1,447 and 82.23 percent, respectively. The sample 
                                                 
3 Because of upgrading, merging or splitting, a huge number of rural counties have changed their names 
or boundary definition. These changes are cautiously traced according to the annual official reports of 
public administration changes, posted at the website of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. 
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 Table 2.1 Sample description 
  County Population 1   
  County Population 1 Region Province 
Number 
of 
Counties   mean Std 
Population 
Coverage 2  
% (2005)   
Region Province 
Number 
of 
Counties   mean Std 
Population 
Coverage 2 
% (2005) 
               
Nation  2094  45.90 33.31 79.47         
               
Coastal  647  57.13 32.10 75.43  Inland  1447  40.87 32.63 82.23 
               
1 Beijing 8  43.57 12.43 30.84  13 Shanxi 100  25.26 13.62 80.25 
2 Tianjin 5  61.67 19.05 34.07  14 InnerMongolia 83  22.74 15.02 81.45 
3 Hebei 139  40.93 16.51 85.86  15 Jilin 39  46.07 27.03 67.59 
4 Liaoning 44  53.97 22.15 58.13  16 Heilongjiang 67  37.69 21.29 70.40 
5 Shanghai 6  55.80 9.02 25.31  17 Anhui 65  76.61 41.07 80.76 
6 Jiangsu 57  92.15 32.78 74.99  18 Jiangxi 82  43.94 24.79 86.98 
7 Zhejiang 61  55.71 29.03 83.46  19 Henan 111  72.52 29.60 84.96 
8 Fujian 61  43.17 28.22 81.29  20 Hubei 64  66.49 35.09 72.35 
9 Shandong 96  71.50 27.65 76.78  21 Hunan 92  61.36 30.41 86.70 
10 Guangdong 77  69.86 40.84 81.76  22 Chongqing 29  82.83 31.22 77.91 
11 Guangxi 77  49.26 31.74 83.71  23 Sichuan 141  48.07 40.30 82.06 
12 Hainan 16  36.57 18.60 90.58  24 Guizhou 79  42.48 24.72 92.67 
        25 Yunnan 117  31.02 19.92 90.02 
        26 Tibet 72  3.19 1.88 94.59 
        27 Shaanxi 93  32.68 20.27 85.13 
        28 Gansu 72  27.93 17.15 81.13 
        29 Qinghai 38  10.38 12.11 83.43 
        30 Ningxia 18  24.71 12.22 78.73 
        31 Xinjiang 85  18.74 12.20 88.20 
               
Non-Poor 1523   48.99 34.59 75.36   Poor   571   37.63 28.03 97.79 
               
Note:  1. Unit in 10,000 people           
 2. Percentage proportion of the sample population to the total population      
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                                      Figure 2.1 Data structure for poor and non-poor counties 
  
coverage in population also varies across provinces, but it exceeds 70 percent for most 
provinces except Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning and Jilin.  
 In this chapter, the poor counties refer to the counties designated by China’s 
central government as the targets for poverty alleviation in 1998. 571 of these 589 
poor counties are included in our sample.  Their population covers 97.79 percent of 
the total population of the 589 counties. In particular, 82 percent of the poor counties 
within our sample (469 out of 571) are located inland, and they account for 32 percent 
of the inland counties. Figure 2.1 illustrates the data structure for poor and non-poor 
groups. 
 The population of counties, used as analytical weights in computing inequality 
measures, differs remarkably between provinces, with a maximum of 92.15 in Jiangsu 
and a minimum of 3.19 in Tibet. In contrast,  Table 2.1 indicates that the within-
province variation of county population is rather small. Although great caution should 
be exercised in attempting to compare within-province inequalities using population 
weighted inequality measures, our study on the temporal changes in a specified 
inequality measure is generally free from the weight-related bias. 
647 coastal 
counties 
1447 inland 
counties 
 645 non-poor 
counties 
  102 poor 
counties 
978 non-poor 
counties 
  469 poor 
counties 
2094 rural counties 
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2.2.2 Inequality measures 
 Two classes of inequality issues will be examined in this chapter. First for 
facilitating comparisons with other studies of inequality issues in China, the Gini 
coefficient is used to compute and compare the overall inequalities. 
 The second class of inequality measures, Generalized Entropy (GE), developed 
by Shorrocks (1980, 1984), and used by Tsui (1993) and Kanbur and Zhang (1999), 
is adopted in the application of inequality decomposition analysis. Suppose the 
population is broken into K mutually-exclusive groups, each GE(a) index can be 
decomposed as  
 
1
( ) ( ) ( )
K
k k b
k
GE a w GE a GE a
=
= +∑  (2.1) 
where GEb(a), the element for between-group inequality, is derived assuming every 
county within a given subgroup k received k’s mean income; GEk(a), inequality for 
subgroup k, is calculated as if the subgroup were a separate population; and, the 
weight for group k is wk, defined by 
 
(1 )a
k
k a
k
vw
s
−
=  (2.2) 
where vk and sk are subgroup k’s population share and income share respectively. 
Following Kanbur and Zhang (1999), we define the kth subgroup’s contribution to 
overall inequality as
)(
)(
aGE
aGEw kk , and the between-group inequality’s contribution as 
the ratio of GEb(a) to GE(a). 
 If the population in the kth subgroup is further divided into h groups, we can 
apply the decomposition procedure expressed in (2.1) to GEk(a).  Substituting the 
decomposed GEk(a) into equation (2.1) gives us the contribution of the between-
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group inequality in the kth subgroup to the total inequality, Cbk, which is expressed by 
)(aGE
GEw kbk , where GEbk is the between-group inequality within the kth  subgroup. This 
measure provides a new and straightforward instrument for the comparison of 
between-group inequalities (groups at the third tier) within different subgroups at the 
second tier. In particular, the use of this instrument allows us to address the following 
questions: Which between-province inequality has a greater impact on the total 
inequality, inland or coastal? Or similarly, does the inland gap between poor and 
non-poor counties have a greater impact on the total inequality than the coastal gap?    
 A technical issue is what value should be chosen for the sensitive parameter in 
our GE estimation. Our results reflect that the choice of this parameter has little 
influence on the interpretation of intertemporal changes of regional inequalities in the 
period of our interest. Therefore, this chapter reports only the Theil index, which is 
GE(1).  
2.3 Income distribution from 1993 to 2005 
2.3.1 Overall inequality 
 Our unique county-level dataset enables us to examine the evolution of the 
overall inequality at national, regional and provincial levels, or for poor and non-poor 
groups. In Figure 2.2, we compare the Gini coefficient with the GE(1) for the GDP 
inequality at the national level. It is quite clear that the curve for the Gini coefficient 
parallels that for the GE(1), implying that in explaining the dynamic trends of the 
overall inequality there is no difference between the two measures. In the rest of this 
chapter, we will use the Gini coefficient as a representative measure to describe the 
evolution of the overall inequality.  
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Figure 2.2 Comparison of the Gini and  Theil index for  
within-nation inequality of GDP 
Table 2.2 Evolution of income distribution at different levels 
  Income GINI    Income GINI 
Region Province 
  Mean 1993 1998 2005   
Region Province 
 Mean 1993 1998 2005
               
Nation   0.40 0.40 0.38 0.42         
               
Coastal  0.37 0.38 0.33 0.41  Inland  0.33 0.32 0.32 0.34
              
1 Beijing  0.17 0.17 0.14 0.23  13 Shanxi 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.33
2 Tianjin  0.16 0.27 0.14 0.10  14 InnerMongolia 0.29 0.25 0.28 0.38
3 Hebei  0.27 0.26 0.25 0.30  15 Jilin 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17
4 Liaoning  0.34 0.26 0.34 0.31  16 Heilongjiang 0.27 0.18 0.29 0.31
5 Shanghai 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.29  17 Anhui 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.22
6 Jiangsu  0.39 0.37 0.37 0.46  18 Jiangxi 0.23 0.35 0.21 0.23
7 Zhejiang  0.26 0.33 0.24 0.28  19 Henan 0.31 0.37 0.26 0.31
8 Fujian  0.28 0.29 0.27 0.29  20 Hubei 0.26 0.21 0.33 0.23
9 Shandong 0.29 0.25 0.30 0.32  21 Hunan 0.24 0.29 0.20 0.25
10 Guangdong 0.43 0.48 0.38 0.48  22 Chongqing 0.24 0.16 0.23 0.24
11 Guangxi  0.24 0.25 0.21 0.29  23 Sichuan 0.33 0.25 0.30 0.31
12 Hainan  0.22 0.20 0.21 0.31  24 Guizhou 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.29
        25 Yunnan 0.45 0.36 0.47 0.38
        26 Tibet 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.26
        27 Shaanxi 0.27 0.33 0.24 0.34
        28 Gansu 0.36 0.29 0.40 0.39
        29 Qinghai 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.38
        30 Ningxia 0.38 0.33 0.38 0.36
        31 Xinjiang 0.37 0.25 0.33 0.44
              
Non-Poor  0.37 0.37 0.34 0.40  Poor   0.31 0.30 0.29 0.33
                             
.2
5
.3
.3
5
.4
.4
5
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
Year
GINI GE1
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 Table 2.2 provides a comparison of the overall inequality trends at different 
levels from 1993 to 2005. The mean of the Gini coefficient in this period is presented 
in the first column, in which we find the national-level Gini was averaged at 0.40 over 
the twelve years; the coastal Gini exceeded the inland Gini by 4 percent; and the non-
poor-group Gini was greater than the poor-group Gini by 6 percent. Among 31 
provinces, Yunnan ranked first with a level of 45 percent. Provinces in the top 10 also 
include Guangdong, Jiangsu, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Gansu, Liaoning, Sichuan and Henan. 
It is noted that Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, the three province-level municipalities, 
have the lowest average rural inequalities.  
 Columns (2) - (4) present the Gini coefficients in 1993, 1998 and 2005, 
respectively. The national rural inequality, as also depicted in Figure 2.3 , decreased at 
an annual rate of 0.58 percent from 1993 to 1998, and then increased at a much higher 
rate, 1.72 percent, in the next seven years, finally rising from 1993’s 0.40 to 2005’s 
0.42. This `U’ shaped trend was followed by the coastal, poor, and non-poor 
inequalities, while the inland inequality remained non-decreasing between 1993 and 
1998. At the provincial level, six provinces such as Liaoning and Hubei showed an 
inverse `U’ shaped trend; eleven provinces including Shanghai, Jiangsu, Inner 
Mongolia and others displayed an upward linear trend; two provinces, Tianjin and 
Jilin, went with a downward linear trend; the rest of twelve provinces  followed the 
`U’ shaped  trend. 
 From 1993 to 2005, the rural inequality increased in all the regions except 
eight provinces, five of which are located inland. The provinces with the highest 
growth rate of the rural inequality are mostly located inland too. For instance, the 
within-province rural inequality rose by more than four percent only in four provinces: 
Shanghai, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang and Qinghai. We employ an F test for the hypothesis 
that the rural inequality grew no faster in inland provinces than that in coastal  
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Figure 2.3 Evolution of GINI inequality at the national level 
 
provinces during 1993-2005. The result significantly rejects the null, supporting that 
the vice versa is true. 
2.3.2 Contributions of between-group inequalities at the second tier 
 We apply GE (1), also called the Theil index, to investigate the evolution of 
the between-group inequality’s relative contribution to the overall inequality. Rural 
counties are divided between coastal and inland regions, between poor and non-poor 
groups, and between provinces. The trends of the three between-group’s relative 
contributions are compared in Figure 2.4, showing that the between-province curve lay 
entirely above 0.35, while the between-region curve was completely between 0.2 and 
0.3, and the between-poor-and-non-poor-group curve below 0.2.  The fact that none of 
the between-group inequality contributions exceeded 0.5 implies that all the between-
group gaps could not compare with their corresponding within-group gaps in 
explaining the overall inequality in the study period. Because the number of groups is 
much greater by provincial classification than that by the other two, it is not surprising  
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Figure 2.4 Contributions of between-group inequalities to 
 overall inequality: GDP 
to see that the between-province inequality had the largest relative importance to the 
growth of the overall inequality. More interestingly, even with the same number of 
groups, the coastal-inland inequality seemed to have more significant power over the 
overall inequality than the between-poor-and-non-poor-group inequality.  
 A rising relative contribution of the between-group gap implies that the 
between-group gap indeed grows faster than the within-group inequality. The curve 
for the contribution of the gap between the poor and non-poor groups was inverse-‘U’ 
shaped after 1994—increasing dramatically until 1998 and decreasing weakly but 
consistently afterward—implying that the poor-and-non-poor disparity did not grow as 
fast as the within-the-poor/non-poor-group gaps in recent years. This fact, 
furthermore, suggests that the central government’s poverty alleviation effort may 
have started to take effect in the late 1990s. Regional policies, however, didn’t appear 
to produce such an equalizing effect. The coastal-inland gap’s contribution exhibited 
irregular growth patterns in the whole period, resulting in a slight increase from 0.20 
to 0.23. Unlike the gap between the poor and the non-poor, the between-province 
inequality’s contribution went ups and downs before 1997 and increased continuously 
  
20 
from 0.36 to 0.43 afterwards (except a sudden drop in 2005). We notice that the period 
when the contribution of between-province gap was growing nonstop overlapped with 
the period when the overall national inequality sustained a continuous growth (as 
shown in Figure 2.3). Their co-movement lasted six years from 1998 to 2004.  
2.3.3 Contributions of between-group inequalities at the third tier 
 The inland and coastal regions can be further divided between provinces, or 
into the poor and non-poor groups. Each divide will create an economy of three 
hierarchical levels. In a top down order, these levels are nation, regions and provinces, 
or nation, regions, and the poor and non-poor groups. (For details of the two divisions, 
please refer to  Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1.) With the new statistics, Cbk , that we derived 
in section 2.2.2 ), the between-province gaps in coastal and inland regions are 
compared in Figure 2.5 and the gaps between the poor and non-poor are compared in 
Figure 2.6. A striking finding is that while the inland contribution of the between-
province inequality is almost below the coastal contribution, the inland contribution of 
the poor-and-non-poor gap has been at least twice as large as the coastal contribution 
all the time but in1993.   
 Although the between-province inequality’s contributions in coastal and inland 
regions exhibit opposite growth patterns in the prior-1999 period, they both started to 
grow steadily since 1999. While the inland contribution of the between-province 
inequality rose steadily in 1999-2005 from 7.03% to 7.09%, the coastal one jumped 
more rapidly from 10.73% to 12.28%.  
 The two trends in Figure 2.6, however, possess similar patterns in all the years. 
Despite a sharp rise from 5.36 percent to 9.70 percent in the years prior to 1998, the 
contribution of the inland gap between poor and non-poor groups continued to 
decrease afterwards and arrived at 6.44 percent in 2005.  The coastal curve for the 
poor-and-non-poor gap’s contribution mostly co-moves with the inland curve, except 
  
21 
.0
6
.0
8
.1
.1
2
.1
4
.1
6
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
Year
Inland Coastal
Note: GE1 is used
 
Figure 2.5 Comparison of between-province inequalities in coastal and 
 inland regions: GDP 
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Figure 2.6 Comparison of coastal and inland gaps between poor and 
 non-poor counties:  GDP 
 
that its fluctuation is less intensive. The year of 1998 was observed as a common 
turning point for the relative contributions of the between-the-poor-and-non-poor-
groups inequalities, no matter inland or coastal. This seemed not arbitrary to us. Since 
the poverty alleviation policies enforced nationwide in 1998 were mainly targeted 
toward the 589 poor counties, such a reduced gap between these poor and other 
counties, in some extent, suggested the success of implementing these policies. 
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 In sum, the above procedure sheds some light on the concern: which between-
group inequality can better explain the dynamic changes of the overall inequality. 
Among the three candidates at the second tier, the between-province inequality 
contributed most to the total inequality, and at the third tier, the between-province 
inequality at the coastal region did. This conclusion, in part, explains the co-movement 
between the overall inequality measured by GE(1) (the dashed line in Figure 2.2), the 
share of between-province inequality (the dashed line in Figure 2.4) and the share of 
coastal between-province inequality (the dotted line in Figure 2.5).  
 Lastly, but most importantly, decomposing the regional inequality into the 
third tier invites new perspectives about the difference between inland and coastal 
regions. Our result highlights the uneven growth of coastal provinces by showing that 
the GDP gap between coastal provinces was relatively large and growing rapidly in 
recent years. On the other hand, strong evidence supports the idea that the inland gap 
between the poor and non-poor played a more important role than its coastal 
counterpart in explaining the overall inequality, implying that future poverty 
alleviation policies may induce a magnificent equalizing effect if priorities are placed 
on inland poor counties. 
2.4 Fiscal distribution in 1993-2005 
2.4.1 Redistribution through fiscal policies 
 Since 1994, the year that China started the tax-sharing fiscal reform, great 
changes have taken place in the intergovernmental fiscal relationship between the 
central and provincial governments, and between the provincial and local 
governments. During the reform period, the central government, which sought to 
balance the need for central control and local autonomy, established an objective-
based tax sharing regime aimed at stimulating local governments’ incentives for local 
tax base expansion by granting a tax rebate proportional to the increment in centrally 
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collected sharing revenues, namely value added taxes and commercial taxes. The 
reform, on the other hand, provides incentives for increased tax effort mobilization 
through devolving expenditure responsibilities and financial authority to local 
governments. The two incentive mechanisms, to an ideal extent, not only can align the 
local administration’s interest with central government’s interest in accumulating 
revenues, but more importantly can align local fiscal interests with good local 
development performance (Jin et al. 2005). 
 The tax sharing scheme, however, has a tendency to trigger less desirable 
trends. The tax sharing system has assigned the center a greater portion of the 
increased sharing revenues, which might undermine the local interest in increasing the 
tax base for shared revenues. Under the rule of tax sharing, a local economy with 
profitable structure and good economic standing can easily attain revenue rebates, 
while a poorly structured economy can not improve its revenue capacity in a short 
time, thereby being placed in a disadvantaged position for revenue rebates. Given that 
China has already encountered vast income gaps between regions, such a favoring-the-
rich rule, if not accompanied by equalizing grants, will exacerbate the previously 
existing fiscal disparities (Bahl, 1999).  
 On the other hand, the fiscal expenditure decentralization reform that hardens 
the budget constraint for all the local governments can undermine the revenue-scarce 
jurisdictions’ ability to provide public goods and services to match basic local needs 
(Park et al., 1996). To a worse extent, a decentralized expenditure system that allows 
upper level governments to pass on expenditure responsibilities to the lower levels, 
will empower the bureaucrats at the upper level to squeeze most of the revenues, 
thereby aggravating the lower level governments’ fiscal burden and preventing them 
from pursing investment strategies to future economic development ( Jin and Zou 
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2003). As a consequence, the income and fiscal gap between poor and non-poor 
jurisdictions will both be widened. 
 The mixing incentive mechanisms inherent in the 1994 reform increase the 
complexity for evaluating and predicting the impact of this fiscal reform. This chapter 
will add to the understanding of this reform by providing a broad picture about the 
evolution of fiscal disparity across different provinces and regions in rural China. Two 
important fiscal indicators are chosen for this purpose. The local government spending 
reflects to what extent the local public good and service are provided by local 
authority. The local revenues, including locally collected taxes and locally retained 
shared revenues ( which are collected by the central tax administration), have a 
twofold meaning: from the tax authority’s perspective, local revenues indicate self-
financing abilities, which are constrained by local tax capacity and the 
administration’s tax effort; from tax payers’ perspective, tax revenues, the part of 
income leaking away from their pockets, are equivalent to an extra burden on their 
economic activities. Thus, the spatial distribution of per capita tax revenues not only 
reflects how local authority’s financing abilities differ across regions, but also reveals 
how the tax burden faced by individuals varies in the spatial dimension. 
2.4.2 Fiscal equalization over time 
 We repeat the analytical procedure in section 2.3 by using two fiscal variables. 
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 report the Gini coefficients associated with real public 
spending per capita and real fiscal revenues per capita at different levels. The results 
of decomposing public spending inequality are displayed in figures 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9. 
And figures 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 contain the results of revenue inequality 
decomposition. 
 We first address the soft-budget concern to local governments by comparing 
the distributions of fiscal expenditures and revenues. Under the strict assumption of  
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Table 2.3 Evolution of the distribution of public spending (service) at different 
levels 
 
  Public Spending GINI   Public Spending GINI Region Province 
  Mean 1993 1998 2005  
Region Province 
 Mean 1993 1998 2005
               
Nation   0.29 0.29 0.28 0.32         
               
Coastal  0.30 0.27 0.26 0.38  Inland  0.26 0.29 0.26 0.26
              
1 Beijing  0.16 0.18 0.20 0.10  13 Shanxi 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.20
2 Tianjin  0.12 0.10 0.10 0.12  14 InnerMongolia 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.29
3 Hebei  0.17 0.18 0.16 0.21  15 Jilin 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.22
4 Liaoning  0.16 0.14 0.16 0.16  16 Heilongjiang 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.19
5 Shanghai  0.15 0.05 0.11 0.21  17 Anhui 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.21
6 Jiangsu  0.28 0.23 0.22 0.39  18 Jiangxi 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.13
7 Zhejiang  0.17 0.13 0.18 0.22  19 Henan 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20
8 Fujian  0.19 0.24 0.16 0.20  20 Hubei 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.14
9 Shandong 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.27  21 Hunan 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.15
10 Guangdong 0.36 0.37 0.33 0.40  22 Chongqing 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17
11 Guangxi  0.20 0.19 0.21 0.25  23 Sichuan 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.24
12 Hainan  0.17 0.12 0.17 0.25  24 Guizhou 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.12
        25 Yunnan 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.21
        26 Tibet 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.22
        27 Shaanxi 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.30
        28 Gansu 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.20
        29 Qinghai 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.25
        30 Ningxia 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.16
        31 Xinjiang 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.21
              
Non-Poor  0.30 0.29 0.28 0.34  Poor   0.25 0.27 0.25 0.24
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Table 2.4 Evolution of the distribution of tax revenues at different levels  
  
  Tax Revenue GINI 
 
 Tax Revenue GINI 
Region Province 
  Mean 1993 1998 2005  
Region Province 
 Mean 1993 1998 2005
               
Nation   0.40 0.40 0.33 0.56         
               
Coastal  0.41 0.40 0.34 0.57  Inland  0.33 0.37 0.29 0.45
              
1 Beijing  0.15 0.12 0.18 0.17  13 Shanxi 0.30 0.34 0.27 0.41
2 Tianjin  0.16 0.22 0.13 0.13  14 InnerMongolia 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.58
3 Hebei  0.27 0.29 0.22 0.43  15 Jilin 0.26 0.35 0.20 0.34
4 Liaoning  0.26 0.28 0.23 0.32  16 Heilongjiang 0.23 0.27 0.19 0.39
5 Shanghai 0.18 0.08 0.14 0.26  17 Anhui 0.22 0.28 0.17 0.39
6 Jiangsu  0.45 0.44 0.36 0.59  18 Jiangxi 0.22 0.30 0.23 0.25
7 Zhejiang  0.26 0.26 0.24 0.31  19 Henan 0.32 0.35 0.27 0.48
8 Fujian  0.28 0.34 0.21 0.35  20 Hubei 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.26
9 Shandong 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.40  21 Hunan 0.23 0.28 0.20 0.30
10 Guangdong 0.55 0.49 0.50 0.63  22 Chongqing 0.20 0.30 0.16 0.31
11 Guangxi  0.26 0.23 0.25 0.31  23 Sichuan 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.46
12 Hainan  0.23 0.29 0.22 0.40  24 Guizhou 0.26 0.33 0.22 0.30
        25 Yunnan 0.38 0.45 0.36 0.41
        26 Tibet 0.47 0.54 0.49 0.39
        27 Shaanxi 0.34 0.39 0.26 0.63
        28 Gansu 0.42 0.50 0.41 0.46
        29 Qinghai 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.39
        30 Ningxia 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.48
        31 Xinjiang 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.52
              
Non-Poor  0.39 0.39 0.32 0.56  Poor   0.31 0.33 0.27 0.46
                            
 
  
27 
the hard budget constraint, the expenditures should be highly correlated with local 
governments’ revenues. This implies the distribution of local expenditures should 
mimic that of local revenues if the budget constraint has been hardened. In our results, 
the spending inequality at the national level (the dashed curve in Figure 2.3 and the 
first row in Table 2.3) was persistently lower and much more stable than the revenue 
inequality (the dotted curve in Figure 2.3 and the first row in Table 2.4), suggesting 
that local expenditures were not highly related to local revenues. We further extend 
the comparison to the coastal/inland regions, provinces and the poor/non-poor groups, 
all rendered similar results, indicating a prevalent soft-budget constraint problem. 
 In Figure 2.3, we find that the revenue inequality at the national level rose 
rapidly and consistently in the post-1996 period, indicating that not only the gap of 
county-level governments’ self-financing abilities but also the gap of tax payers’ tax 
burdens were widened. On the one hand, this enlarged revenue gap probably resulted 
from a soft budget constraint problem in which more and more resource-scarce 
counties became transfer-dependent and less fiscally responsible, thus purposely 
reducing their tax efforts. On the other hand, it can also be the consequence of 
hardened budget constraints that limited resource-scarce counties’ tax revenues to its 
poor tax base. Since the measurement of local fiscal revenues doesn’t allow us to 
distinguish a tax-base effect from a tax-effort effect, the policy implication of this 
result largely remains ambiguous. Nevertheless, from the tax burden’s perspective, 
one can at least clearly infer that the mobility of labor and capital across rural counties 
is too low to allow regional competition to effectively prevent the diverging growth of 
tax burdens.   
 Table 2.3 reveals the fact that the spending inequality decreased consistently in 
the inland region and the poor group, but increased in the coastal region and the non-
poor group. From 1993 to 2005, all but seven inland provinces reduced the rural 
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spending inequality within their boundaries. In the same period, only two out of 
twelve coastal provinces equalized within-province spending. These contrasting 
results uncover that the inland fiscal policies tend to induce more equalized public 
spending or service provision.   
 In Table 2.4, we find that most provinces, regions and groups experienced a 
reduction in the revenue inequality prior to 1998, but in the post-1998 period the 
revenue inequality increased dramatically in both regions as well as in the poor and 
non-poor groups. During the recent period, the revenue inequality even grew at a 2-
digit annual rate in provinces such as Hebei (11.22 percent), Hainan ( 12.51 percent), 
Heilongjiang ( 12.96 percent), Anhui (14.60 percent) and Shaanxi ( 15.19 percent). 
These rapid upward movements in fiscal gaps deserve our close attention.    
 Like the income inequality, the overall inequalities of both fiscal variables are 
most seriously affected by the inter-province inequalities. This is supported by Figure 
2.7 and Figure 2.10, in which the contribution curves of the between-province 
inequalities are located well above the other two between-group inequalities. Figure 
2.7 doesn’t show much fluctuation in the three contribution curves, while in Figure 
2.10 we can find that the between-province revenue inequality rapidly increased its 
contribution between 1996 and 2001 and so did the between-region inequality, 
indicating that the two between-group inequalities of fiscal revenues grew much faster 
than their corresponding within-group inequalities in this period.  It is also observable 
from Figure 2.10 that the poor-and-non-poor revenue gap’s contribution declined 
continuously ever since 1994, implying that the revenue gap between poor and non-
poor counties didn’t grow as fast as the variations within the poor or non-poor 
counties. 
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Figure 2.7 Contributions of between-group inequalities to the overall inequality: 
public spending 
.1
4
.1
6
.1
8
.2
.2
2
.2
4
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
Year
Inland Coastal
Note: GE1 is used
 
 
Figure 2.8 Comparison of between-province inequalities in coastal and inland 
regions: public spending 
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Figure 2.9 Comparison of coastal and inland gaps between poor and non-poor 
counties: public spending 
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Figure 2.10 Contributions of between-group inequalities to the overall inequality: 
fiscal revenues 
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Figure 2.11 Comparison of between-province inequalities in coastal and inland 
regions: fiscal revenues 
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
Year
Inland Coastal
Note: GE1 is used
 
 
Figure 2.12 Comparison of coastal and inland gaps between poor and non-poor 
counties: fiscal revenues 
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 When the revenue and spending inequalities at the regional level are broken 
down into between-province and within-province inequalities, we compare the inland 
and coastal between-province inequalities in Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.11. Figure 2.11 
reveals that the revenue gaps between coastal provinces exceeded their inland 
counterpart by a large margin. This essentially agrees with the conjecture that the 
coastal between-province inequality accounted for a relatively larger portion of the 
total inequality than the inland between-province inequality. This conjecture, however, 
was only supported by the spending inequality after 2002. Prior to 2002, the coastal 
contribution of the between-province spending gaps mainly fell behind of the inland 
contribution. Nevertheless, the overall results from the investigation of GDP, spending 
and revenue inequalities provide collaborative evidence in favor of this conjecture.  
 The inland contribution of the spending gap between poor and non-poor 
counties, as described in Figure 2.9, fell sharply between 1995 and1997. Likewise, the 
inland contribution of the fiscal revenue gap between the poor and non-poor groups, as 
shown in Figure 2.12, declined continuously after 1994. These patterns suggest that 
fiscal redistribution policies functioned well in inland areas as a way to effectively 
equalize expenditures and revenues between the poor and non-poor counties. Our 
result, however, produces no evidence to support the idea that fiscal policies in coastal 
areas had any significant equalizing effect.  
 From Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.12, we can also observe that for the public 
spending, the relative contribution of the between-the-poor-and-non-poor gap was 
generally greater in the coastal area than in the inland area, but for the fiscal revenue, 
the case was the opposite ever since 1993 and didn’t change until 2003. Combining 
with our previous findings in Figure 2.6 that the inland GDP gap between the poor and 
non-poor groups contributed more to the overall inequality than the coastal counterpart 
leads us to the conclusion that the existing poverty alleviation policies still need to pay 
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more attention to GDP and revenue equalization between the inland poor and non-
poor counties, though they seemed to have induced prominent equalizing effect for 
inland public spending. It is worth noting that, due to the consistent decrease in recent 
years, the inland poor-and-non-poor gap in fiscal revenues started to fall below the 
coastal gap in 2003 and continued the trend thereafter. This may imply a recent 
success of the inland region in equalizing revenue resources between the poor and 
non-poor groups.   
2.5 Conclusion 
 Our study focuses on the regional distribution of income, fiscal spending and 
local tax revenues in rural China over the period between 1993 and 2005. Our results 
strongly support the fact that the overall GDP inequality rose nonstop in most recent 
years, and its dynamic changes can better be explained by the changes in the between-
province gap than by the coastal-inland and poor-and-non-poor gaps. Despite this, one 
still can argue that the dominance of the provincial gap may have been exaggerated 
because it can be mainly due to a large number of groups in a provincial divide. 
Nevertheless, this result adds to the general understanding of China’s regional 
inequality by providing substantial evidence for a recent trend toward rising 
divergence between provinces.  
 Though unexpectedly, we find evidence for the lack of correlation between 
fiscal spending and revenues, which in turn suggests that recent fiscal reforms have 
softened the budget constraints on rural county governments. This conclusion 
disagrees with Jin et al. (2005), who find hard budget constraints in their study period, 
1983-1998. The soft-budget-constraint problem may become particularly prominent 
after the 1994 reform, because the tax sharing arrangement greatly increases the 
central government’s revenue share in the total and the ratio of revenue to GDP for 
most provinces, therefore increasing the central and provincial abilities of fiscal 
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resource redistribution, or their abilities to rescuing poor counties. On the other hand, 
the soft budget constraints to county level governments may reflect the central and 
provincial governments’ increasing concerns for reducing regional inequalities.      
 However, our study finds that fiscal equalization policies, which are more 
effective in equalizing public service provision in the inland region, didn’t produce a 
significant income equalization effect in this region. The finding that inland areas still 
have a larger income gap between the poor and non-poor counties than coastal areas 
raises doubt about the effectiveness of the fiscal equalization policies in achieving the 
goal of poverty alleviation.    
 Despite the above, our study strongly support that the target method enforced 
in the process of poverty alleviation has achieved a huge success in reducing the gap 
between the designated poor counties and others. According to our analysis, the 
between-group gaps have declined remarkably relative to the within- poor- or- non-
poor- group gaps. This, in particular, calls for a redefinition for the targeted counties, 
which, we believe, may help increase the effectiveness of future target supporting 
programs. 
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APPENDIX : DATA 
           Prior to 1996, GVIAO and its agricultural share were calculated and 
extensively used in China, but they were gradually replaced by GDP measures 
between 1997 and 2000. This transition has been clearly reflected in the annually 
published CPFSMPCC, which reported GVIAO before 2000 and GDP measures after 
1997. 
 In order to build up a consistent dataset for 1993-2002, we develop a 
reasonable and practical method to approximate the GDP levels for the period of 
1993-1996. In our approach, GDP is approximated by a weighted sum of the two 
exclusive components for GVIAO, namely the gross value of industrial output (GVIO) 
and agricultural output (GVAO), by using a weight identical within a province but 
varying across province boundaries. The method thus comprises two stages. First, the 
weights are estimated through a regression of GDP on GVIO and GVAO province by 
province using the pooled county-level data from 1997 to 2000. Second, the county 
level GVIO and GVAO prior to 1997 are summed with the estimated provincial 
weights. Almost all the regressions at the first stage yield R2 greater than 0.95, 
indicating a good fit of these GDP prediction models to our data. Therefore, the 
estimated GDP of 1993 to 1996, together with the reported GDP since 1997, are used 
as proxies for county level nominal income. 
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Chapter 3    
Equalizing or not? Assessing the Intergovernmental Grants and their 
Incentive Effects in China’s Fiscal Reform      
3.1 Introduction   
 Intergovernmental grants, fiscal transfers between different tiers of the 
government system, have assumed an important role in China’s fiscal reform. At 
times, these grants are directly designed for the purpose of intergovernmental fiscal 
equalization. At other times, the grants are by-products of general government 
programs that have been motivated by specific development concerns. In spite of the 
variation in their nature, the total amount of different grants is often huge and critical 
to the current process of fiscal expenditure decentralization. For instance, in 2002, the 
overall grant funding received by county level governments exceeded 39 percent of 
these local governments’ total budgetary revenue and 43 percent of their budgetary 
expenditure.  
 Our goal in this chapter is to study how responsive intergovernmental grants 
received by local government units are to fiscal revenues collected by those units. The 
first and foremost concern over the relationship is for the degree of regional equity 
that grants have generated. From an efficiency perspective, it is desirable to implement 
intergovernmental grants that enable poorer regions to compete effectively with 
fiscally stronger ones. Such an equalization function may best fit current need in 
China, where the regional disparity, mainly attributed to biased industrial policies that 
have allowed policy-favored regions to exploit their position to promote growth at the 
expense of poorer ones, has grown rapidly in the past fifty years and is continuing to 
grow (Kanbur and Zhang 2005).  
 A secondary concern, however, is for the possibility of long-run grant 
dependency and the disincentive effect. Parallel to the case of individual transfers, 
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intergovernmental grants that target the poor can probably cause an adverse incentive 
problem in recipients:  if expecting that revenue reduction would induce a sharp 
increase in grants, potential recipients may spontaneously reduce their self-raising tax 
revenues; otherwise, they may increase revenues as much as possible (Chernick, 1979, 
Moffitt, 1992). These distortionary behaviors, which will be called as grant-driven 
“crowding out” or “crowding in” later in this chapter, can seriously undermine the 
efficiency of fiscal decentralization because transfer-dependent local governments 
have weak incentives to be fiscally accountable (Rodden, et al. 2003) 
 In the literature of public finance, the grant-driven crowding effect has been 
largely ignored. For example, the grant level is usually taken as an exogenous variable 
in many studies of the impact of grants on public spending. Most empirical tests 
(Weicher 1972, Gramlich, et al. 1973, Feldstein 1975, Case et al. 1993, Olmsted et al. 
1993) in the context of the United States have found that a wide range of grants indeed 
increase the recipient’s public spending, rather than reduce the tax revenue. The 
results, though overwhelming, are doubtful because they may have simply over-
estimated the reaction of spending to grant receipts by failing to account for the 
possibility of the grant-driven “crowding in” effect. This point, for instance, is 
addressed by Knight (2002), who has developed a legislative bargaining model in 
which grant levels positively relate to preferences for public goods. Contrasting to 
previous studies, his empirical estimates imply that after correcting the endogeneity, 
grants do crowd out public spending.  
 Knight’s study, in particular, highlights that grant allocation policies, under 
certain design limitations, are vulnerable to grant-seeking behavior of recipients who 
have substantially strong preference for grants. Such behavior not only supports the 
endogeneity of grant allocation, but can also play an even more important role than 
other existing arguments (Bradford and Oates 1971a, b, Courant, et al. 1979, Hines 
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and Thaler, 1995) in determining the relationship of grants and tax revenue or public 
spending. Although Bradford and Oates’s (1971a, b) collective choice model predicts 
that unconditional lump-sum grants, equivalent to a tax cut, lead to little or no increase 
in spending, Knight reveals that public spending on high-way projects positively 
correlates with actually received grants, but negatively correlates with as-if-exogenous 
grants, indicating that the grant-driven “crowding in” effect can dominate the ‘normal’ 
crowding out effect. 
 Recipients, however, may take varying strategies to seek for increased grant 
funds. The characteristic of grant polices are essential for predicting and 
understanding their fiscal responses. For example, the United States may be the wrong 
place to look for grant-driven crowding out behaviors, because fiscal equalization 
grants, which usually cause grants to negatively relate to revenues, have never 
amounted to much in its grant system (Oates 1999). In other words, the recipients’ 
fiscal behavior relies on their expectation about how grants respond to tax revenues, 
which will eventually depend on observable characteristics of national or sub-national 
grant policies. This chapter will demonstrate that when a grant system consists of 
multiple motives, for instance fiscal equalization and project-implementation, the 
relationship of grants and tax revenues can be highly nonlinear, thereby resulting in 
differential behaviors among recipients with different fiscal capabilities.  
 The intuition for non-linearity in grant-and-tax-revenue relationships comes 
from the conjecture that grant responsiveness to local tax revenue depends on grantor 
governments’ motives, and the motives will in turn depend on local revenue resources.  
The grantor government, for example, can have two different motives: fiscal 
equalization and project finance. The fiscal equalization motive suggests that the grant 
supply should respond negatively and substantially to locally sourced revenue 
whenever the local revenue level is at a very low margin. When the local revenue 
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exceeds a benchmark, the rescue motivation might evaporate, even though the overall 
grants might not. They could continue to exist to fund projects or task assignments. 
However, the key point is that the second form of grants has mixed relations with local 
revenues, which will not necessarily yield dramatic and negative grant responsiveness. 
A similar logic has been employed in Cox, et al. (2004), where a significant nonlinear 
relationship between private income transfers and household income is found to be 
consistent with the co-existence of altruistic and exchange motives.  
 Does China’s grant system produce the above nonlinear relationship? To 
answer the question, we test a variety of linear and non-linear models on the grant 
determination equation among county level governments in China. It turns out that a 
single-threshold linear spline model, which requires that counties with revenues below 
a threshold and counties with revenues above the threshold have different revenue 
coefficients, best fits our data. Above all, this finding provides strong evidence against 
the traditional linear specification for the grant-revenue relationship, indicating that 
recipients with different revenue capacities should not expect uniform responsiveness 
of grants to local revenues.  
 The second question of our interest is whether the grant allocation policies in 
China have lead to grant-driven crowding out (in) behaviors among recipients. This 
question can be answered by testing the endogeneity of locally generated revenues 
with respect to grants. Not to our surprise, the testing result supports the hypothesis of 
endogeneity, implying a divergent consequence that low-revenue-capacity counties 
tend to under provide tax effort while high-revenue-capacity counties tend to over 
provide.  Since these behaviors can seriously undermine the efficiency of a grant 
system, future study on grant policies have to highlight the importance of policy 
design to incorporate the reactions of grant recipients. 
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 Another interesting finding in this chapter is the remarkable disparity between 
rural and urban grant policies. Indicated by our estimation, rural grants negatively 
respond to revenues in the lower range and bear no relationship to revenues in the 
higher range, while urban grants positively relate to revenues in the high range and 
have no relation with revenues in the low range. The contrasting result, on one hand, 
implies that rural counties are more likely to receive equalization grants but less likely 
to obtain project-purposed grants. Accordingly, rural counties with high revenue 
capacity or urban counties with low revenue capacity might have been largely under-
funded.  On the other hand, since the rural pattern creates incentives for reducing tax 
effort and the urban pattern for increasing tax effort, the fiscal capacity gap that has 
already been present between rural and urban will probably be enlarged in the long 
run.   
The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows. Section 3.2 examines the 
structure of intergovernmental grant system in China after the 1994 reform. Section 
3.3 introduces the empirical methodology we will apply to test the nonlinear 
relationship and other hypotheses. The results are presented and discussed in section 
3.4. And section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 China’s grant system  
A feature of China’s grant system is that the grant flow is entirely vertical, as 
horizontal transfers are almost nonexistent. In such a framework, the government at 
the next level up is the only possible grant provider to a local government. Essentially, 
we will demonstrate that because upper-level governments have two different motives 
for giving grants, namely safety net provision and project implementation, the grant-
revenue relationship could vary with the dominant motive, which in turn depends on 
local revenue resources. 
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The multi-tier government system may add complexity to our analysis, since it 
is always possible that sub-national governments, such as provinces, prefectures and 
counties, might not implement a policy in exactly the way that the center expected. 
Actually, sub-national governments, after receiving grants from their upper level 
government, are free to make their own reallocation decisions according to local 
conditions (State Council 2002). Therefore, even though the center seems to have 
placed great importance on fiscal equalization objective, it is still in doubt whether 
those sub-national governments will follow the center closely. In other words, all the 
governments at the intermediate level, as well as the center, are critical in assessing 
grant policy outcomes. 
3.2.1 The central government’s grant policy   
Previous studies have shown that China’s grant system reflects three major 
objectives of the center: taxation mobility, fiscal task implementation and fiscal 
resource equalization.  
The 1994 fiscal reform initiated a special category of grant called “tax return” 
to enhance lower-level governments’ taxation mobility within a tax-sharing 
framework. The level of tax return is set to increase proportionally to the additional 
increment in VAT and consumption tax that have been collected by the central tax 
administration, i.e. State administration of taxation  (SAT later), from a local tax base. 
Bahl (1999) argues that the tax return is essentially an incentive mechanism by which 
the center can induce local governments to increase potential tax bases for centrally 
collected taxes, and thereby has no clear role in regional redistribution. However, it is 
observed by Li (2003) that the tax return can largely act against fiscal equalization in 
that regions with large revenue capacity usually receive a greater amount of tax return 
grant money than regions with small revenue capacity. The reason underlying this 
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observation is that local governments, in fact, have no discretion to raise the tax rate, 
and their ability to expand the tax base necessarily relies on economic prosperity.    
Meanwhile, it has been shown that the earmarked grant, one of the largest 
grants in China, bears little relevance to fiscal equalization. Li (2003) indicates that the 
earmarked grant is made up of a wide range of project- or spending- oriented grants, 
among which those targeted to economically underdeveloped areas, consisted of only 
11.85% in 1997. Additionally, because some grants under this category require 
recipients to provide matching funds, the earmarked grant has often been proved to tilt 
toward more economically developed areas. 
 However, some evidence suggests that since 1994, a series of transitional 
reforms have been implemented to address the concerns of regional disparity of public 
resources and services. Liu (2003) documents that a new category of grant, called the 
“transfer payment subsidy”, was introduced in 1995 to cover the gap in local standard 
public spending and local standard revenue, especially in regions with unusual fiscal 
difficulties. While Li (2003) argued that its overall size has been too small to correct 
the unequal fiscal resource distribution, the transfer payment subsidy has dramatically 
increased its share in the central government’s total revenue, namely from 0.64% in 
1995 to 1.61% in 2001, indicating fiscal equalization has attracted growing attention 
in the dynamic central-provincial grant system. In addition, according to Zhang 
(2003), another type of grant called the “minority region subsidy” was initiated in 
2000 and set to target those traditionally minority-populated areas, which are usually 
backward in economic conditions for geographical or historical reasons. Undoubtedly, 
this move also indicates the center’s objective to remove the fiscal gap in very poor 
regions.    
 Tracing the history of the center’s grant policies, we can perceive that while 
fiscal equalization is not a driving force of the 1994 tax reform, it has become more 
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and more important in the subsequent adjustments of intergovernmental relationships. 
However, equalization grants are not set to achieve absolutely equal public spending 
in spite of local fiscal capacities. Their function, to a greater degree, is to offer a fiscal 
safety net to regions with scarce revenue capacity so that their basic need for public 
service could be matched. Meanwhile, self-sufficient regions, which usually have no 
access to equalization grants, may obtain earmarked grants associated with specific 
development projects. 
3.2.2  Grant structures and the decision power of sub-national governments 
 According to a classification by the Ministry of Finance, thirteen categories of 
grants are available to county-level governments in 2002. Several documents indicate 
that the tax return is regulated by the center and usually calculated by identical 
formulas even among different provinces. Since we will focus on the grants under the 
discretion of sub-national governments, the tax return will be excluded from our 
empirical analysis. 
 The rest of twelve grants can be further divided according to their practical 
objectives into three major classes: general-purpose grants, policy related grants and 
earmarked grants. The general-purpose grants, which are the old system grant, the 
transfer payment grant and the minority region grant, are provided on a need basis. 
Policy related grants are those given to help implement certain income or macro 
policies; they are the wage grant, the income-tax-base adjustment grant, the clearance 
grant, the agriculture reform grant, the bond issuance grant, the schoolteacher grant 
and the policy adjustment grant. Earmarked grants are those that are conditional on 
spending projects, such as capital constructions and social relief for calamities.  
 General-purpose grants are essentially priority transfers to regions in dire fiscal 
straits. The transfer payment grant, started in 1995, is designed to rescue counties 
whose “standard revenue” can’t afford to pay off their “standard expenditure”. The 
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minority region grant is designed to help minority-populated regions with backward 
economic conditions. Slightly different is the old system grant, in which both donors 
and recipients were selected in 1988 and seldom changed since then. This grant can 
roughly belong to this class, because all the recipients, except for a few, are regions 
with deficient public services and stagnant economic conditions, as indicated by Liu 
(2003).  It is worth noting that, in addition to their common function in assisting fiscal 
equalization, a distinctive feature of these three grants is that their distribution process 
are both transparent and objective, leaving sub-national governments little room to 
play against the center’s purpose. 
 Policy-related grants are more complex in nature. On one hand, most of these 
grants are to compensate local governments for fiscal loss caused by the center’s 
macro or income policies. Thus, the level of a policy grant usually depends on how 
seriously the local government will be affected by the policy. For example, the forest 
reservation grant, which mostly goes to the western or mountain counties, can serve to 
channel more fiscal resources to poor regions. On the other hand, the allocation rules 
for several policy grants such as the wage grant and the bond issuance grant may 
already take into account regional economic inequality. Zhang (2003) indicates that 
when the center raised the wage rate for government employees in 1999 and 2001, 
only western and central regions were offered the wage grant to cover the additional 
expenditure.  
 According to Li (2003), the center has increased the number of earmarked 
grants, some of which, despite being relatively small, have an equalizing function in 
that they are funds supporting construction in inland and economic underdeveloped 
areas. However, the majority of earmarked grants such as those for capital 
construction require local matching funds, which can counteract equalization grants by 
making regions with small fiscal capacity less competitive in grant application than 
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ones with large fiscal capacity. Another feature that may undermine the role of 
earmarked grants as an equalization tool is the absence of clear and uniform formulas 
for allocation. Under such a condition, earmarked grants as well as most policy-related 
grants are likely to be exposed to arbitrary allocation processes, and thus could 
become redistribution loopholes, by which sub-national governments may reinforce or 
offset the center’s equalization policy.     
 It is noted a sub-set of policy-related or earmarked grants are capable of 
serving as instruments for fiscal equalization, even though their original purposes 
don’t state so. This will happen especially when the allocation rules of these grants are 
subject to the discretion of sub-national governments seeking to redress regional 
inequality. Taking account of this point, this chapter will use an aggregate of all the 
grants (excluding the tax return), rather than the general-purpose grant alone, to study 
the allocation of fiscal equalization grants. 
 Figure 3.1 gives the relative size of each grant received by 2815 counties in 
2002, indicating that the share of general-purpose grants is only 8.9%, while the shares 
of earmarked grants and policy-related grants are 22.4% and 46% respectively. Figure 
3.2 compares the structure of grants received by rural counties with that of grants 
received by urban counties. From this figure, it can be observed that rural counties 
tend to receive more funds in almost all the grant categories except for the earmarked 
grant, the income-tax-base adjustment grant, the clearance grant and the “others 
grant”. Since urban counties have average per capita revenues twice as large as rural 
counties, the result might imply that these four grants can be viewed as anti-
equalization grants.  
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Figure 3.1  Composition of grants received by counties in 2002 
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Figure 3.2 Comparison of grant structure in rural and urban counties: 2002 
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 Most importantly, China’s grant funds to local governments, as demonstrated 
above, comprise two major purposes: provision of a fiscal safety net to revenue-scarce 
jurisdictions and exchange for project or policy implementation in local jurisdictions. 
Ideally, the safety-net grant, ensuring minimum standard public services to be 
provided at jurisdictions lacking revenue capacity, varies strongly and negatively to 
the local revenue level only if the local revenue collection can’t match the standard 
spending need. When the local revenue otherwise exceeds the standard, the safety-net 
grant becomes zero and locally received grant becomes purely project-oriented. Since 
the project-implementation grant, which most often requires matching funds from 
recipients, is biased in favor of high-revenue jurisdictions4, the response of overall 
grant supply to local revenues, therefore, is expected to be positive for self-sufficient 
recipients, but negative for the self-insufficient ones.  
3.3 Methodology   
 Our policy analysis predicts a non-linear grant-revenue relationship, which is 
featured by a dramatic turning point at a certain value of tax revenues. To verify this 
relationship, we apply a threshold model to estimate net grant receipts, G, the gross 
grants received by counties deducted by gross transfers to the upper level 
governments.   
3.3.1 Specification  
 The grant supply function is estimated by a continuous linear spline model 
with a single knot. The essence of the model lies in three points: (1) The regression 
function of the dependent variable, G, is restricted to being linear and continuous in all 
the explanatory variables; (2) the coefficient on the regressor of our interest, which is 
the budgetary tax revenue, R, is not constant in two regimes which are determined by 
                                                 
4 Bradhan and Mookherjee (2006) pose that with the capture of the local (province) government, there 
is a tendency for the local (province) government to over-provide the service to local elites (rich 
counties) at the expense of the non-elite.  
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whether or not the budgetary tax revenue does exceed a threshold value; (3) the 
threshold value is assumed to be exogenous, implying that other regressors don’t 
influence the regime switching5. Suppose K is the threshold level of the budgetary tax 
revenue, at which the slope of the linear regression line changes. Let d (K) denote a 
dummy variable whose value is unitary if R ≤ K and zero otherwise, where R is the 
local revenue level.  Then the spline regression function for grant allocation can be 
specified as       
 1 2( )( ) (1 ( ))( )G d K K R d K R K Zα α β ε= − + − − + +  (3.1) 
where α1, α2, and β  are constants, Z represents other regressors, and ε is an error term. 
Clearly, equation (3.1) says that the partial effect of R on G can take either -α1 or α2, 
depending on whether a low-revenue or high-revenue regime exists.  
 Table 3.1 lists the dependent and independent variables to be used in our 
estimation. To control for local fiscal needs, we include in the grant function a number 
of demographic and economic variables, which are per capita GDP, agriculture share 
in production, manufacture share in production, population size, fiscal surplus in the 
previous year, and government employee share in population. First, since county level 
governments are responsible for providing infrastructure investment for agriculture or 
manufacture production, we will use per capita GDP, agriculture share and 
manufacture share in production to control for counties’ need for basic infrastructure 
investment. Second, because counties are also responsible for providing most public 
services such as school education, health care and social security, demographic 
variables such as population size and shares of young people and old people in the 
population should be used to control for the standard need for public service.  But  
                                                 
5 This exogeneity assumption is made to insure statistical consistency and efficiency. We will discuss 
how to relax this assumption in section 3.3.4 and 3.3.5. 
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Table 3.1  Summaries of fiscal, economic and demographic variables for grant recipients in 2002 
 
    Urban   Rural  Pooled 
  Unit Mean  Std   Mean  Std  Mean  Std
observations  726    2029    2755
          
Fiscal variables          
          
Grants yuan per capita 279.84  270.56  403.26  400.27  370.74  374.45
Local revenues yuan per capita 509.67  685.03  225.24  242.25  300.19  427.15
Tax returns yuan per capita 117.35  198.76  57.11  83.50  71.97  125.14
Fiscal surplus in the previous 
year yuan per capita 38.89  91.06  8.75  89.68  16.69  91.00
             
General economic conditions            
GDP yuan per capita 17061.58  13780.07  5811.68  4681.98  8776.26  9523.81
Agriculture share ratio 0.12  0.13  0.33  0.15  0.27  0.17
Manufacture share ratio 0.43  0.16  0.34  0.15  0.36  0.16
             
Population characters             
Population   10,000 40.27  29.43  46.35  34.69  44.75  33.49
Government Employees 1 / 100 people 2.35  1.14  3.26  1.61  3.02  1.56
             
Geographic characters             
Central ratio 0.42  0.49  0.38  0.49  0.39  0.49
Western ratio 0.17  0.38  0.35  0.48  0.31  0.46
             
IV variable             
Local revenues in 1993 yuan per capita     129.31 132.21     
  in 2002 price                   
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since population structure variables are not available at the county level, we only 
include population size to meet this requirement. Third, in presence of soft budget 
constraint, the grantor would take a fiscal deficit as an indicator for urgent need of 
fiscal support, therefore fiscal surplus in the previous year is used to control for fiscal 
need associated with deficit traps. Last but not least, China’s grant system has a 
specific concern for wage payments to local government employees, whose pay rates 
are uniformly preset by the center. Usually, counties with a large number of public 
employees need more funds to sustain the operation of government offices. Thus, we 
use the share of government employees in the population to control for the fiscal need 
associated with administrative operation.  
 In a multi-tier government system, the governments on the same tier such as 
provinces may hold different preferences regarding grant redistribution. It might be 
the case that two counties in different provinces can receive different amount of grant 
funds even when other conditions being equal. Therefore, we also include provincial 
and regional indicators to control for the preference difference arising from grantors’ 
location. 
3.3.2 Estimation   
 To estimate the threshold K and other parameters simultaneously, we will 
employ a non-linear least square approach (NLLS), which minimizes the sum of 
squared errors associated with regression function (3.1). Hansen (1999) suggests that 
the approach be carried out in three steps: first, the model is estimated by OLS for 
every possible K and the sum of squared errors is saved in accordance with each value 
of K; second, the optimal K is determined by searching for the one which corresponds 
to the lowest sum of squared errors; last, the other parameters in the model are 
estimated by OLS using the selected value of K. We follow his routine closely except 
that in the second step we exclude the 5 percent highest and lowest values of the 
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threshold variable, R, from the threshold search. In doing so, we ensure that each 
regime contains at least 5 percent of the population. 
3.3.3 Specification tests    
 We test the single-threshold linear spline model with several alternative 
specifications: a standard linear model, polynomial models up to the 6th order, a linear-
quadratic spline model with a single knot, and a linear spline model with double knots.  
Among them, a linear –quadratic spline model allows the spline function to be 
quadratic in the higher-revenue regime and the linear spline model with two knots 
takes the following form  
 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 2( )( ) ( ( ) ( ))( ) (1 ( ))( )G d K K R d K d K R K d K R K Zα α α β ε= − + − − + − − + +  
  (3.2) 
where d(Ki) equals 1 if R<Ki, otherwise 0, and K1<K2.  In principle, the NLLS 
approach can be used to search for a pair of (K1, K2) yielding the lowest sum of 
squared errors in OLS. However, such a search may add to computational burdens 
greatly, especially when the data size is large. An alternative method that can 
effectively save searching time is a two-step Wald test in which K1 first takes the 
estimated value of K in equation (3.1), and then K2 will be estimated by a search 
process. According to Hansen (1999), this estimation method, originally proposed and 
proved by Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998), can produce consistent estimates of 
(K1, K2).   
 Following Hansen (1999), we implement a least-squares test, in which the 
hypothesized model is rejected in favor of the alternative model if the F statistic as 
follows                     
 ( )h a
a
SSE SSEF n
SSE
−=  (3.3) 
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takes extremely large values. In (3.3), SSEn and SSEa are the sum of squared errors in 
the hypothesized model and the alternative model, respectively, and n indicates the 
sample size. The distribution of the above F statistic usually attains asymptotic 
properties of the conventional χ2 distribution, but it may depart markedly if conditional 
heteroskedasticity presents; therefore we compute the p-value by a bootstrap method6 
in which the p-value is approximated by the percentage of 1000 independent draws 
that exceed the observed value of F.  
3.3.4 Testing for endogeneity 
 Although Chan and Tsay (1998) have proved that the estimation procedure in 
section 3.3.2 can render efficient and consistent estimates, the estimates in the grant 
function may not have the desirable properties since revenues usually are not 
exogenously determined.  Intuitively, an endogeneity problem will arise because 
revenues are correlated with the error terms in the grant function, which reflect 
counties’ unobserved preferences for grants. 
 We use an IV approach to test and correct for the endogeneity of tax revenues. 
Since the endogeneity of the threshold variable can bias the LS estimate for K, we 
modify the original three-stage approach as : first, local revenue is regressed on an 
extended set of regressors including exogenous variables in equation (3.1) and 
selected instrument variables; second, the estimated revenues, instead of the original 
local revenues, are used by the NLLS approach in search for the optimal threshold K; 
third, the slope coefficients in equation (3.1) are estimated by using GMM with a 
threshold value of K fixed at the optimal level obtained at the previous stage. The 
estimators of this procedure, called IV GMM later, are consistent according to Caner 
and Hansen (2004). 
                                                 
6 A more technical discussion about this bootstrap approximation can be found in Hansen (1999). 
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 The instrument variable selected for this purpose is tax revenue in 1993, which 
is expected to be orthogonal to the grant function residuals and correlated with the 
revenue of current year. On one hand, this variable is free from the impact of grant 
incentives, thereby satisfying the first requirement. The intuition, in particular, comes 
from the perception that the intergovernmental grant before the 1994 fiscal reform had 
a relatively small size such that the overall influence of grant allocation on recipients’ 
revenue level was negligible. To verify the second requirement, we use the t-test to 
examine the statistic significance of the instrumental variable coefficient at the first 
stage regression. The result, as will be shown in the next section, supports the validity 
of this instrumental variable.  
 Meanwhile, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for the endogeneity of 
revenues will be carried out at the third stage. To be consistent with the routine of 
DWH tests, we employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model, rather than the IV 
GMM model, to compare with the LS model. Such a test is valid because conditional 
on a large sample size, the 2SLS model can also produce consistent estimates for a 
threshold spline model with endogeneity problems (Caner and Hansen 2004). In 
particular, this test, focused on the consistency of slope estimates, assumes that the 
threshold used in both comparison models are identical and equal to the value of the 
consistent estimate obtained from the IV GMM approach. 
3.3.5 Testing for sample partition    
 The above estimation and test procedures all rely heavily on a critical 
assumption that the threshold value K is exogenous to all the regressors in the grant 
function. In practice, one may need to relax this assumption if, for example, one 
believes that the grantor may change his preferences with some perceived 
characteristics of recipients, such as whether they belong to a rural or urban region. A 
simple yet informal way to test the null hypothesis that K doesn’t vary with a regressor 
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variable is to divide the whole sample by the values of a suspected regressor, then 
compare the estimated coefficients in split samples with those in the pooled sample.  
 In a more formal way, we conduct an F (or Wald) specification test, in which 
revenue variables are multiplied by group dummies in estimation and the revenue 
coefficient estimates for one group are jointly tested against those for the other group.  
We partition the population of counties according to urbanization level (whether a 
county belongs to rural or urban regions), and repeat the sample partition test by using 
five different specification models. The more often the null is rejected, the more robust 
is the decision to split the sample according to urban-rural classification. 
3.4 Data and empirical results   
3.4.1 Data     
 The data used in this chapter mainly come from the China Public Finance 
Statistics Materials for Prefectures, Cities and Counties (CPFSMPCC), published by 
the Ministry of Finance. It covers budgetary public finance information as well as 
basic economic statistics for every jurisdiction at the county level: counties, urban 
districts located in prefecture-level cities, and county-level cities. In this chapter, we 
use the data of 2002, mainly because the techniques described in section 3.3 are 
temporarily not applicable to panel analysis7. In addition, the rural budgetary revenues 
in 1993 are available in the 1993 issue. Because of data limitation, the endogeneity 
test and the IV NLLS estimation will be performed among rural counties only.   
 The revenues in 1993 are expressed in terms of the price in 2002 by 
multiplying the original revenues by the provincial ratio of the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) in 2002 to the CPI of 1993. The CPIs are collected from China Statistics Year 
Book of 2003.  
                                                 
7 Another reason for choosing 2002 is because CPFSMPCC only publishes both rural and urban data for 
every province since 2002. Prior to this year, most provinces don’t have urban data.  
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 Our empirical analysis will be restricted to counties and districts that received 
net grants in 2002. In doing so, about 33 observations, accounting for only 1.1% of the 
total number of counties, were left out. The net grant recipients consist of 2755 
counties or districts: 2029 rural counties and 726 urban ones, which are spread across 
all the 31 provinces in China.    
 Since urban districts are usually able to receive preferential policies due to 
location advantage, the grant policies faced by rural and urban counties may be 
substantially different.  For comparison purposes, the two groups, as well as the 
pooled data, will be examined separately.  Table 3.1 presents the summary of a set of 
fiscal, economic and demographic variables by different groups. The rural counties, 
whose GDP per capita is less than half of the urban GDP per capita, have larger per 
capita grant receipts, but smaller per capita tax revenues in 2002.  In the rural group, 
grant receipts account for 58.8% of total fiscal income (defined by the total amount of 
grants, local revenues and tax returns). In the urban group, these receipts only account 
for 31.2% of total fiscal income.  
 In this data set, we also find evidence for the existence of fiscal disparity 
within rural and urban counties. It is surprising to observe that urban counties have 
greater revenue inequality than rural counties, as the coefficients of variation for 
revenues among urban and rural counties in 2002 are 1.34 and 1.08 respectively. 
Meanwhile, the revenue disparity in rural counties slightly increases over the period 
from 1993 to 2002, as the coefficient of variation rises from 1.02 to 1.08. Such a 
change throws doubt on the equalizing function of the recent grant policies, thereby 
motivating us to thoroughly explore the distributional characteristics of grants. 
3.4.2 Non-parametric evidence for non-linearity     
 In the literature, linear models may have been overused to estimate the grant 
allocation equation. Our concern is that if the relationship between grants and  
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Figure 3.3  Local polynomial regression of grant receipts on tax revenues 
 
revenues is actually non-linear, using a linear model will produce inconsistent 
coefficient estimates. In comparison with parametric approaches, the advantage of 
anon-parametric approach lies in its independence of model specification, or 
assumptions for error term distribution (Hardle, 1990, page 5). Thus, we use a non-
parametric approach to explore a general relationship between grant receipts and tax 
revenues. Figure 3.3 provides the results of using a local polynomial regression 
procedure with a second order polynomial function and a window width of 250 yuan. 
This figure shows that the two curves associated with all the counties and rural 
counties are both in a “U” shape, roughly conforming to our prediction of a non-linear 
model with a single kink. But for urban counties, the curve doesn’t have a significant 
kink, even though it appears to be non-linear.   
3.4.3 Estimation    
 Estimation results for rural, urban and pooled counties are presented in Table 
3.2 , Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 respectively. In each table, the linear spline model with a 
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 Table 3.2  Parametric regressions for rural counties 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)    (5)  
 Linear  Polynomial  Linear spline   Linear / Quadratic Double threshold LS
Variable Coefficient Het St E  Coefficient Het St E  CoefficientHet St E  Coefficient Het St E Coefficient Het St E
Revenue -0.027 0.079 -1.809 0.365         
Revenue threshold (K1)       119.717 7.573 99.234 7.196 55.000 13.330
Revenue threshold (K2)             119.717 7.863
Revenue below K1       -2.258 0.406 -3.038 0.620 0.651 1.672
Revenue above K1       0.015 0.073      
     Revenue-K1          -0.159 11.845   
     (Revenue-K1)^2          0.822 0.362   
Revenue between K1 and K2            -2.408 0.570
Revenue above K2             0.010 0.076
Revenue^2    52.951 12.633         
Revenue^3    -647.562 212.051         
Revenue^4    3662.143 1571.875         
Revenue^5    -9658.088 5048.215         
Revenue^6    9683.441 5778.548         
Surplus_1 0.218 0.136 0.227 0.129 0.200 0.134 0.214 0.134 0.216 0.136
GDP 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003
Agriculture -244.566 62.940 -89.669 56.783 -326.385 74.076 -316.556 70.858 -172.344 79.260
Manufacture -570.818 66.375 -328.563 55.763 -552.057 69.932 -522.736 69.318 -411.099 84.135
               
Employees 179.830 13.948 187.276 15.702 182.402 14.252 183.803 14.190 185.102 16.353
Central 1.224 14.409 -5.552 15.022 -8.218 14.825 -12.957 14.512 -2.350 12.863
Western 181.547 17.235 167.004 19.616 148.398 18.990 148.500 18.738 157.366 16.895
Observations 2029  2029  2029  2029  2029 
R2 0.674  0.686  0.685  0.686  0.684 
K1 quantile       0.305  0.209  0.050 
K2 quantile                         0.305  
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 Table 3.3 Parametric regressions for urban counties 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 Linear  Polynomial Linear spline  Linear / Quadratic  Double threshold LS
Variable Coefficient Het St E  Coefficient Het St E  CoefficientHet St E  Coefficient Het St E  Coefficient Het St E
Revenue 0.188 0.027 -0.765 0.182         
Revenue threshold (K1)       529.084 164.099 647.206 157.843 529.084 58.572
Revenue threshold (K2)             1220.254 325.391
Revenue below K1       0.036 0.051 0.061 0.043 -0.199 0.088
Revenue above K1       0.211 0.032      
     Revenue-K1          0.277 0.055   
     (Revenue-K1)^2          -0.131 0.068   
     Revenue between K1 and K2            0.373 0.090
     Revenue above K2             0.173 0.034
Revenue^2    14.287 3.044         
Revenue^3    -84.743 21.818         
Revenue^4    228.578 69.405         
Revenue^5    -277.585 97.030         
Revenue^6    122.287 47.802         
surplus_1 0.400 0.163 0.351 0.149 0.382 0.162 0.339 0.165 0.361 0.159
GDP -0.0001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Agriculture -24.109 58.880 -39.972 61.024 -36.168 60.084 -2.963 58.515 -65.919 57.823
Manufacture -37.380 45.802 76.814 43.325 7.307 52.558 29.130 53.292 35.341 42.424
Employees 73.379 14.424 98.038 18.170 83.175 14.000 81.769 14.246 90.389 17.521
Central 31.960 15.147 41.984 14.573 35.008 13.811 40.420 13.489 33.738 14.103
Western 62.601 20.510 87.262 19.482 73.425 19.916 77.704 19.863 80.311 19.504
               
observations 726  726  726  726  726 
R2 0.565  0.609  0.584  0.589  0.596 
K1 quantile       0.740  0.784  0.740 
K2 quantile                         0.906  
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  Table 3.4 Parametric regressions on pooled data 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)    (5)  
 Linear  Polynomial  Linear spline   Linear / Quadratic Double threshold LS
Variable Coefficient Het St E  Coefficient Het St E  Coefficient Het St E  Coefficient Het St E  Coefficient Het St E
Revenue 0.124 0.029 -1.019 0.188         
revenue threshold (K1)      130.922 6.109 118.609 5.962 130.922 7.689
revenue threshold (K2)            671.400 134.772
Revenue below K1       -2.027 0.288 -2.421 0.360 -1.809 0.295
Revenue above K1       0.138 0.027      
     Revenue-K1          0.072 0.040   
     (Revenue-K1)^2          0.152 0.090   
Revenue between K1 and K2            -0.083 0.069
Revenue above K2             0.186 0.034
Revenue^2    17.517 3.544         
Revenue^3    -111.556 27.362         
Revenue^4    326.647 92.582         
Revenue^5    -425.411 134.997         
Revenue^6    197.804 68.213         
surplus_1 0.181 0.052 0.199 0.116 0.163 0.116 0.179 0.115 0.185 0.116
GDP 0.0003 0.0006 0.003 0.001 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
Agriculture -142.303 32.127 -115.261 44.524 -237.620 55.381 -244.898 55.275 -267.281 55.499
Manufacture -413.631 25.303 -216.727 35.372 -396.392 35.794 -392.445 35.697 -371.161 34.475
Employees 162.379 3.001 174.503 13.307 166.706 11.852 168.416 12.029 170.580 12.138
Central 14.941 10.739 4.567 11.773 0.786 12.058 -1.520 12.307 -9.021 12.437
Western 170.554 11.990 160.934 15.760 137.661 16.052 137.316 16.067 137.154 16.063
Rural -36.914 15.021 -14.247 13.933 -26.399 14.801 -24.463 14.719 -20.903 14.461
observations 2755  2755  2755  2755  2755 
R2 0.629  0.653  0.645  0.647  0.650 
K1 quantile       0.321  0.262  0.321 
K2 quantile                         0.917  
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single threshold, i.e. model 3, is contrasted with four alternatives, which are a standard 
linear model (model 1), a 6th order polynomial model (model 2), a linear-and-quadratic 
spline model (model 4), and a linear spline model with two thresholds (model 5). The 
first three parameters in model 3 are essential to the nonlinear relationship between 
grants and local revenues. The estimate of the rural revenue threshold is 119.717 yuan 
per capita, corresponding to the 31st sample quantile. For rural counties whose 
revenues are below 119.717 yuan per capita, their grant allocation function has a slope 
of -2.258, indicating that lowering revenues can bring up a remarkable increase in 
grant supply. For rural counties above the revenue threshold, the slope of their grant 
function is 0.015, which, however, is not statistically significant. Contrastingly, the 
urban revenue threshold, 529.084, locates at the 74th sample quantile, below which the 
slope of the grant function is 0.036 but insignificantly different from zero, and above 
which the slope becomes 0.211, implying higher revenues can induce more grants. 
The patterns for estimates using pooled data are quite similar to rural patterns. The 
threshold, 130.922 yuan per capita, and the slope for the low revenue regime, -2.027, 
are both much closer to the rural results. The only difference is that counties with 
revenues above the threshold have a slope of 0.138, which is significantly different 
from zero. In sum, these results can justify two important features of the grant system: 
equalization grants are more prevalent in low-revenue rural counties but not operative 
in high-revenue or urban counties; project grants are effective only in high-revenue 
urban counties, but hardly available to low-revenue or rural counties. 
 Besides revenue variables, only two variables in model 3 have estimated 
coefficients that not only are always statistically significant but also have consistently 
yielded the same sign in rural, urban and pooled results. One is the number of 
government employees as a share of the population, which is revealed to be an 
important factor inducing more grants. In this point, our study agrees with Shih and 
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Zhang (2007). The other is the dummy variable for counties in the western region, the 
most economically backward area in China. These counties, indicated by our results, 
have received more grants than the eastern counties. Therefore, strong evidence 
suggests that the current grant system has placed great importance on supporting 
administrative operation and reducing regional disparity.   
 Some results, however, seem to contradict the traditional expectations. For 
instance, it is observed that after controlling for other factors, the agriculture and 
manufacture shares of production significantly and negatively correlate to grant supply 
to rural counties, implying that the fiscal need for supporting the third industry, 
namely service industry, prevails in the process of rural grant allocation. Another 
example is the estimates for the previous year’s fiscal surplus, which are positive in all 
the selected samples, yet only insignificant in the rural sample. In other words, our 
data don’t appear to support the soft-budget hypothesis in which counties with larger 
budget deficits are supposed to obtain more grants from the government at the upper 
level.   
 In Table 3.4, we also notice that the rural dummies always yield a significantly 
negative impact on the grant supply. That is to say, when other factors being 
controlled for, a county can expect more grants from the above if it is labeled as urban 
rather than rural administration. This, therefore, constitutes direct evidence of 
grantors’ preference for urban areas. 
3.4.4 Tests of sample partition       
 It is revealing to notice that the dramatic difference between the rural and 
urban estimates that has been observed in model 3 is not an occasional phenomenon at 
all. In fact, the different patterns of rural and urban estimates can be found in each of 
the five models. For instance, in model 1, the marginal effect of local revenues among 
rural counties is -0.027, taking the opposite sign to the estimated result for urban  
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 Table 3.5 Wald tests of sample partition by urbanization 
 
( Ho : Revenue coefficients are identical in different sub-groups.) 
      
 Wald statistics 
Degree of 
Freedom P-value  conclusion 
Model 1 8.82 1 0.003  Reject 
      
Model 2 9.37 6 0.154  Don't reject 
      
Model 3 12.48 3 0.006  Reject 
      
Model 4 11.35 4 0.023  Reject 
      
Model 5 10.98 5 0.052  Reject 
  
counties, which is 0.188. The results of contrary signs in rural and urban estimates are 
also found in model 4 and model 5. Moreover, even though model 2 results in the 
same sign for all the coefficients of revenue variables in rural and urban samples, their 
magnitude is strikingly different. Another obvious difference between rural and urban 
samples is the substantial disparity between threshold values in models 3, 4 and 5. 
What we have perceived seems to suggest that the grant allocation function faced by 
rural counties exhibits a pattern different from what suits urban counties.  
 The hypothesis of no difference between rural and urban samples is formally 
examined by using a Wald test in which a two-regime model and a single-regime 
model are estimated and compared. The Wald test statistics associated with model 1 to 
model 5, as reported in Table 3.5, are 8.82, 9.37, 12.48, 11.35 and 10.98, respectively, 
four of which are significant at the 5% significance level, suggesting rural and urban 
counties should be separated to estimate the grant allocation function. 
3.4.5 Tests of nonlinearity and specification   
 The primary concern about the specification of grant function is whether a 
conventional linear model can appropriately fit the data. We perform a test of the 
linearity hypothesis against the linear spline hypothesis, which boils down to testing  
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 Table 3.6 Bootstrap tests of polynomial grant functions  
 against spline grant function 
 
Rural (2029)  Urban(726) Polynomial 
Order 
# of 
bootstrap 
replications 
Wald 
statistics P-value  
Wald 
statistics P-value 
       
1 1000 69.416 0.000  14.982 0.001 
2 1000 52.547 0.000  59.434 0.000 
3 1000 64.889 0.001  46.096 0.000 
4 1000 44.005 0.004  52.714 0.000 
5 1000 32.242 0.006  13.905 0.226 
6 1000 26.981 0.011  9.342 0.780 
7 1000 27.514 0.024  11.333 0.713 
              
whether the regression slopes in high and low revenue regimes are identical. The Wald 
statistics and their corresponding p-values are reported in the first row of Table 3.6. In 
the rural column, the p-value of 0.000 means that none of the 1000 replications can 
yield a Wald statistic greater than the observed value of 69.416. Consequently, the 
linear relationship is rejected in favor of a linear spline. The same conclusion is 
obtained in the urban column. 
 Secondly, we are interested in the question whether the linear spline model can 
do better than polynomial models with second or higher orders. The specification test 
of a polynomial model against a linear spline model is repeated for all the orders up to 
7 and the results are also presented in Table 3.6. Again, for the rural samples, the 
spline structure is accepted at the 5% significance level by contrasting it with the 
polynomials of all the orders below 8. But for the urban samples, the acceptance of the 
spline structure doesn’t occur when the order of polynomials rise above 5. 
Accordingly, we can infer that the grant function for rural counties has a stronger 
tendency to take the proposed spline specification.  
 Another concern one may address is whether two regimes are sufficient to 
capture the nonlinearity of the grant-revenue relationship. In response to this concern, 
we propose two modified spline models, one of which allows the high-revenue regime  
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Table 3.7 Bootstrap tests of single knot spline against other splines 
 
Rural    Urban 
  
  
 
# of 
bootstrap 
replications 
Wald 
statistics P-value conclusion   
Wald 
statistics P-value conclusion 
Linear-
quadratic 
spline 
1000 9.432 0.452 don't reject  13.554 0.223 
don't 
reject 
Double-
knot 
spline 
1000 -1.368 0.982 don't reject  21.612 0.381 
don't 
reject 
                  
 
to take quadratic form and the other of which imposes two knots, thereby three 
regimes, to test against the single-knot linear spline. The results are presented in Table 
3.7. None of the test statistics can approach the significant level of 5 %, which 
provides strong evidence for not rejecting the null hypothesis of a single-knot linear 
spline in favor of a two-knot spline or a linear-quadratic spline.  
 The statistical test results in this section jointly prove that the linear spline 
model with a single knot can best fit in the grant allocation function with our data set. 
This conclusion matches the prediction we have obtained from the theoretical model 
for grant behaviors.   
3.4.6 Endogeneity test 
 Table 3.8 reports the rural results of model 6 and model 7, which use the IV 
NLLS approach for estimation of the threshold value. Their difference lies in that 
model 6 uses GMM to estimate slope coefficients and model 7 uses 2SLS. In spite of 
this, the results of these two models are quite similar, reflecting the large sample 
asymptotic property of consistency.  For comparison, we also present in Table 3.8 the 
results of the linear spline model that doesn’t use an IV approach (model 3). As Table 
3.8 indicates, model 7 (or model 6) and model 3 don’t always yield similar coefficient 
estimates. The threshold revenue predicted by the IV approach is 109.02, which is  
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Table 3.8 Grant allocation functions for rural counties 
 
  (6)  (7)   (3) 
 IV GMM   2SLS  Linear spline  Variable 
  Coefficient Het St E  Coefficient Het St E  Coefficient Het St E
          
Revenue threshold (K1) 109.023 8.604 109.023 8.604 119.717 7.573
Revenue below K1  -5.967 2.190 -5.033 2.869 -2.258 0.406
Revenue above K1  -0.019 0.107 -0.102 0.919 0.015 0.073
Surplus_1  0.180 0.129 0.205 0.121 0.200 0.134
GDP  0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003
Agriculture Share  -478.993 140.818 -483.234 139.240 -326.385 74.076
Manufacture Share  -541.576 74.678 -509.353 101.315 -552.057 69.932
Employees  188.658 17.269 187.933 19.329 182.402 14.252
Central  -28.013 21.907 -27.094 23.114 -8.218 14.825
Western  95.812 40.842 100.324 49.948 148.398 18.990
          
Observations  2029  2029  2029 
R2  0.671  0.619  0.685 
K1 quantile  0.298  0.298  0.305 
                    
 
about 10 percent lower than the threshold estimate in model 3. As the revenue variable 
falls in the low revenue regime, the slope estimate in model 7 is statistically significant 
and appears about twice as steep as that in model 3. Unfortunately, the slope estimates 
for local revenues in the high regime, though having different signs, both fail to pass 
the significance test. In spite of this, the existing disparity can serve as weak evidence 
for the endogeneity of the tax revenue variable.  
 Our results of the statistical tests, however, strongly support the endogeneity 
hypothesis. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of the NLLS model against the 2SLS model 
yields an F statistic of 3.74, whose corresponding p-value is 0.015, suggesting 
rejection of the null hypothesis of the revenue variable’s exogeneity. In order to check 
the robustness of this test, we further examine the validity of using tax revenues in 
1993 as the instrumental variable. At the first stage regression in IV GMM or 2SLS, 
the coefficient on this instrumental variable turns out to be statistically significant at 
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the 5-percent level, supporting the prediction that tax revenues in 1993 and 2002 are 
correlated.  
 Passing the endogeneity test has important empirical meanings. Above all, this 
lends support to the assumption that budgetary tax revenues are affected by recipients’ 
unobservable preferences for grant funds. This assumption, if true, will imply 
recipients’ grant-seeking behaviors in the budgetary planning process. It is thus 
reasonable to infer from our endogeneity test results that grant-seeking behaviors are 
present among rural counties.   
 Alternatively, the presence of the grant-seeking behaviors can be shown by 
comparing the reported revenues with the ‘true’ revenues. Since model 6 uses the 
predicted revenue, a proxy for the real revenue-generating ability, the estimated 
revenue slopes in this setting, in fact, reflect the grant responsiveness to the true, or in-
absence-of-grants, budgetary revenues. The estimates in model 3, on the other hand, 
reflect the relationship of grant supply and the actually-reported revenues. These two 
grant supply curves are displayed in Figure 3.4, in which the grant level corresponds 
to the sample averaged level of all the variables except for budgetary revenues.  
Clearly shown on the left side of Figure 3.4, the grant curve associated with the true 
revenues more steeply lies above that associated with the reported one, implying that a 
low-revenue county, when its corresponding grant level is set, usually has a reported 
budgetary revenue level lower than the true one. In the high-revenue regime, both 
grant supply curves become horizontal and very close to each other, showing no 
obvious evidence for the gap of reported and true revenues. The divergent pattern, 
therefore, supports significant grant-seeking behaviors among low-revenue rural 
counties only. It is, indeed, not surprising to find no grant-seeking behaviors among 
high-revenue rural counties because the entirely inelastic grant supply leaves no 
benefit for misreporting.  
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Figure 3.4 Rural grant-revenue relationship 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 The primary reason for the surge of interest in the non-linear specification for 
the grant allocation equation is its implication for the government redistribution 
policy. Our results indicate that for the rural low-revenue-capacity counties, net grants 
are generally equalizing, while for the urban high-revenue-capacity counties, net 
grants have counter-equalization effect. Nevertheless, no significant grant-revenue 
link can be observed among the 69 percent of rural counties whose revenues are above 
the rural threshold and the 74 percent of urban counties whose revenues below the 
urban threshold. In other words, for the majority of counties, the effects of equalizing 
and disequalizing grant policies sum up to zero.  
 The estimated grant pattern also suggests that the potential for the crowding 
out effect on revenues is large for grants to rural counties with small revenue capacity, 
and the potential for the crowding in effect is large for grants to urban counties with 
large revenue capacity. With the instrumental variable approach, we further 
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demonstrate that the fiscal equalizing grant policies do lead rural counties with small 
revenue capacity to purposely reduce tax collection efforts in exchange for more grant 
funds. Therefore, our study predicts that the inequality of local fiscal capacity among 
the rural recipients might ironically rise if the current equalizing grants aren’t altered 
to pay due attention to the adverse incentive effect.  Moreover, since the project grants 
to the rich urban recipients can possibly stimulate extra fiscal effort, or crowd in tax 
revenues, the rural-urban gap in fiscal capacity will definitely be widening over time, 
resulting in greater social welfare loss. 
 Until now, most empirical studies of China’s fiscal decentralization process 
(Jin, et al. 2005, Park et al., 1996) claim that fiscal reforms have hardened budget 
constraints and increased local government accountability. Our study, however, 
reveals that the budget constraints are not hardened for all the local governments. 
Because the center attempts to use grants to bailout revenue-scarce rural counties, 
these counties become more transfer-dependent and less fiscally accountable. 
Therefore, the efficiency of fiscal (expenditure) decentralization is in part offset by 
improperly-designed intergovernmental grants.  
 It is also worth mentioning that we find significant disparity in rural and urban 
grant policies: the equalizing objective dominates grants to rural areas and, in contrast, 
the project implementation objective dominates grants to urban areas. Considering that 
most urban counties can better self-finance local spending, we suggest that the dire 
rural areas should be rendered priorities in future project grant assignments. That’s, 
the central government needs to design regulations that can ensure the fiscal 
investments be channeled to places that have urgent financial need, in stead of places 
that can provide more returns to the grantors.     
 To conclude this chapter, we underscore the importance for policymakers to 
take account of the tradeoff of grant transfers and their disincentive effect. Whether an 
  
69 
intergovernmental grant can fulfill the original objective largely depends on the 
allocation criteria, which should best incorporate recipients’ grant-seeking incentives. 
This chapter finds that China’s overall grant system doesn’t work well in lining up the 
grantor’s equalization objective with recipients’ incentives. Solving this problem 
requires linking grant allocation to desirable expenditure achievements. For instance, 
Shah (2004) recommends developing countries who attempt to attain national equity 
objectives to adopt non-matching grants conditional on the attainment of standards in 
quality, access and level of services and to make sure the grant funds inversely vary 
with fiscal capacity. This goal may be important to strive for, but not easily attainable 
in practice. The cost of accurately collecting a large amount of local information can 
be too high given the current institutional quality in China. Therefore, studies on how 
to make grant policies both cost-effective and incentive-compatible will be most 
rewarding in the future. 
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Chapter 4  
Race to the Top and Race to the Bottom: Tax Competition in Rural 
China8         
4.1  Introduction 
Fiscal federalism or fiscal decentralization has been widely called for to promote 
economic growth in both developed and developing countries. One key argument is 
that fiscal competition creates disciplinary pressures to preserve market incentives 
(Qian and Roland, 1998). The model by Qian and Roland (1998) has a crucial 
assumption that all the regions are identical. In the real world, in particular in spatially 
large countries, such as China, resource endowment does differ across regions.  
A few studies on tax competition have taken the heterogeneity into account. As 
shown by Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Wilson (1991), most two-agent competition 
models suggest an inverse relationship between jurisdictions’ incentives for tax rate 
reduction and their tax base sizes—when tax competitors differ in size, the one with a 
larger tax base is less willing to participate in tax competition, hence resulting in a 
higher tax rate. Recently, Cai and Treisman (2005) proposed an alternative model 
which provides opposite predictions. Their capital competition model has multiple 
competitors with different size of endowment. They argue that when the endowment 
difference is large, seeing little hope of winning the capital competition, poorly-
endowed units tend to invest less in infrastructure and take part less actively in capital 
competition, which in turn can widen the gap in initial endowment. Most strikingly, 
Cai and Treisman’s hypothesis seems to justify regional economy polarization in the 
presence of endowment inequality, in spite of the canonical convergence growth 
theory.  
                                                 
8 This chapter is co-authored with Xiaobo Zhang. 
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While the literature has rich evidence for the presence of tax competition among 
states or counties in the United States or local units in other industrialized countries 
(Bartik 1991, Case et al 1993, Brett and Pinkse 2000, Buettner 2001, Oates 2002, 
Hendrick et al 2005), the empirical studies in developing or transition countries have 
been more scant in large due to lack of data (Bardhan, 2002). In particular, there are 
few studies examining whether the tax competition behavior is homogenous or not in 
developing countries with large regional difference in resource endowment.   
China provides a good ground for empirically testing the above question. Since 
the economic reforms, China has decentralized its fiscal system by devolving a large 
portion of expenditure responsibilities to the state and local governments but also 
ensuring local governments’ authority over the locally sourced revenues. Jin et al. 
(2005), for example, demonstrate that in the period of 1995-1999 the provincial 
governments in China faced much stronger fiscal incentives and fiscal decentralization 
enhances growth. They argue that reform has created self-finance pressure on local 
officials such that they have to compete with each other to protect the local tax 
revenue base and attract business investment so as to prompt economic development. 
However, they assume the effect of fiscal decentralization is the same for all the 
provinces in their analysis. Considering its sheer size and large regional variation, it is 
highly likely that the regional fiscal competition behavior and consequence may vary 
as suggested by the rising regional inequality in the past several decades.  
In China, studies on local tax competition behaviors are rare not only because 
local governments used to lack authority over local fiscal administration but also 
because the official tax rate is identical across jurisdictions and the setting of tax 
tables, no matter for locally or centrally sourced tax revenues, has been solely 
controlled by the central government. In such a unified tax system, the effective tax 
rates, however, may vary because of difference in local discretional efforts in 
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collecting taxes. Such discretional activities have been widely observed in China by 
many case studies (Bahl 1999), indicating that intergovernmental tax competition is a 
practical issue deserving serious concern. 
By making use of a panel data set at the county level covering a longer and more 
recent period, we attempt to empirically test whether tax competition exists or not, and 
if yes, whether competition behavior is subject to their underlying endowment. In 
particular, we develop an empirical framework that is not only able to test the presence 
of intergovernmental tax competition within a country but also flexible enough to 
reflect the variation of the degree of tax competition in different regions. In addition to 
presenting the pattern, this study empirically relates the endowment heterogeneity to 
various degrees of tax competition incentives.  
In specific, we examine whether poorly endowed units9 have been disciplined by 
capital competition in the same way as richly endowed units. For this purpose, we 
compare the counties in two distinct clusters: each is essentially a spatial cluster of 
similarly endowed counties, though the sizes of endowments are remarkably different 
between clusters. It is noted that within the cluster, counties are homogeneous in both 
the endowment and the geographic location dimension, which should ensure perfect 
competition equilibrium. Our finding does verify the existence of tax competition 
among neighboring counties. Furthermore, we find a difference between these two 
types of clusters: in the cluster with large endowments, competition is in a “race to the 
bottom”, while in the cluster with small endowments, it is in a “race to the top”.10 The 
negative relationship between the tax rate and the cluster-specific endowment size 
                                                 
9 In this chapter, both poor units and poorly endowed units refer to the units whose size of endowment 
is less than the national average.  To be more specific, they are the units with GDP per capita lower than 
the national average. 
10 Many previous studies use “race to the bottom” and “race to the top” to address the welfare concerns 
of intergovernmental competition. In this chapter, we borrow the terms to simply refer to the action of 
reducing tax rates or raising tax rates in the process of neighborhood competition. The welfare 
implications of these actions, however, will be discussed separately.     
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implies richly endowed clusters are more motivated to compete for capital than poorly 
endowed ones. Initial endowment matters to whether spatially clustered counties will 
run a race to the bottom or a race to the top in tax rate settings. In particular the 
counties with poor initial endowments are less disciplined by capital competition. This 
lends support to the hypothesis of Cai and Treisman. 
The rest of this chapter will continue as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the 
theoretical background for tax competition behaviors and proposes a new measure to 
detect tax competition at a local level. Section 4.3 describes the data and presents the 
spatial and temporal patterns of local tax competition behaviors in China. Section 4.4 
applies a regression approach to examine how endowment and other factors affect tax 
competition choices. Finally, section 4.5 assesses implications of our empirical results 
and concludes this chapter.  
4.2  Rethinking the measure of tax competition 
4.2.1 A simple capital-flow model for tax competition 
We begin by presenting a simple model of county government behaviors. In this 
chapter, we focus on a specific type of intergovernmental competition—capital tax 
competition—where counties with immobile labor impose a tax rate on mobile capital. 
This type of strategic interaction has been formalized by Zodrow and Mieszkowski 
(1986), Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1989) and others, and reviewed by Wilson (1999) 
and Brueckner (2003). In the simplest framework for capital tax competition, a county 
chooses the tax rate to maximize its objective function (Vi), which also depends on the 
amount of capital that resides within its borders (Ki).  The distribution of capital 
among competing counties is affected by the tax rate that it chooses (ti) and that its 
competitor chooses (t-i). Thus, the county’s tax rate, ti, is partially determined by t-i. 
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Consider a county that has only one revenue source from capital taxes. We 
assume that it maximizes a combined utility deriving from both the tax revenue and a 
representative citizen’s welfare. Its objective function can be written as  
 ( , ) [ ( ), ( , )] ,i i i i i i i iV t K U c K G t K t K= +  (4.1) 
where ci denotes the representative citizen’s private consumption in county i and G the 
consumption of public good or services. The private consumption is affected by Ki 
through the income effect in which more capital raises the marginal productivity of 
workers and thus the wage rate for each worker. Meanwhile, the public good provision 
is assumed to be fully financed by tax revenues (no government debts), and thereby Gi 
is a function of both ti and Ki.   
The final distribution of capital across counties has to satisfy the no-arbitrage 
condition, that is, the after-tax return to capital should be equalized in every county. 
Suppose ki represents capital per worker in county i, and )( ikf  is the production 
function. This condition can be given by 
 ( ) ( )i i i ir f k t f k t− −′ ′= − = −  (4.2) 
where )( ikf ′  is the marginal product of capital, or pre-tax return, in county i, and r is 
the equalized after-tax return. When competing units are sufficiently small, they are all 
price takers who regard the after-tax return as given. Equation (4.2) depicts the 
relationship between ki and ti— the rise in ti causes a decrease in capital so that the 
marginal product of the capital stock can rise to the point where the after-tax return 
equals r.11 Similarly, an increase in t-i decreases the level of k–i, thus causing ki to 
increase.  
                                                 
11 A formal proof for the statement that ki and ti are negatively correlated other things being equal, is given as 
follows. Taking derivatives with respect to ti on the first two items in (4.2) gives      1−∂
∂⋅=∂
∂
i
ii
kk
i t
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 , 
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The tax-induced capital flow depends on how the marginal product of capital 
changes in response to the change in capital stock, which can be denoted by 12    
  
 1i i
i kk
k
t f
∂ =∂  (4.3) 
It is worth noting that ikkf  is affected by the size of capital stock and other 
exogenous characteristics of county i. Therefore, the capital mobility implies that the 
capital stock in a particular county, Ki ( note: iii knK ⋅= ),  depends on the tax rates in 
all the competing counties, exogenous characteristics of i (Xi), as well as  exogenous 
characteristics of all other competitors (X-i). Then, Ki is given by 
 ( , , , )i i i i iK K t t X X− −=  (4.4) 
Substituting equation (4.4) into (4.1) yields 
 
, , ,( , , , ) [ ( ( , , )), ( , ( , , ))] ( , , )i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iV t t X X U c K t t X X G t K t t X X t K t t X X− − − − − − − −= +  
 (4.5) 
which indicates that the optimal tax rate, ti, is an implicit function of t-i The solution to 
(4.5) reflects a Nash equilibrium in which county i chooses the tax rate that maximizes 
its utility function given a tax rate t-i, which meanwhile is the best choice for its 
competing county given ti。 Such a solution can be described by a tax reaction function 
as follows   
 ( , , )i i i it h t X X− −=  (4.6) 
                                                                                                                                            
where ikkf denotes the second derivative of production function f(ki) with respect to ki. It is noted that 0=∂
∂
it
r
, 
because r is assumed as a constant when the number of competitors is large. Thus, 
1 0i i
i kk
k
t f
∂ = <∂ . 
 
12 Same as 11. 
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This tax reaction function does not explicitly reveal whether or not ti is positively 
related to t-i. Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) show that the slope of this function can 
be positive or negative depending on which specific functional form is used. They 
attribute tax rate variation to the differences in production technology or consumer 
preferences. On the other hand, even though the function forms are identical, the level 
of Xi and X-i may affect the pre-tax returns )( ikf ′   and )( ikf −′ , which in turn affects 
how ti reacts to the change of t-i. Therefore, without restrictive assumptions that reduce 
the complexity in the setting of this type of model, any attempt to obtain a unique 
relationship between ti and t-i will turn infertile even under the idealistic condition of 
perfect capital mobility.   
Most theoretical literature is based on one key assumption that all the counties are 
identical and choose the same optimal tax rates (Wilson 1999). This case clearly 
suggests that a positive correlation of tax rates should occur for counties with similar 
endowments. Another prominent feature of this case is that capital mobility imposes a 
potential revenue penalty on any single county that attempts to raise the tax rate alone. 
Therefore the equilibrium tax rate is lower than it would be without capital 
competition. Simply put, tax competition would yield the clustering of low tax rates 
among counties that are rather alike. This prediction has spurred a wave of new 
empirical studies in testing the presence of tax competition or interactions in tax rate 
settings. As indicated before, the empirical studies on the test of heterogeneous tax 
competition behavior are much rarer.       
4.2.2 Empirical tests for tax competition 
The method that many empirical studies have applied to test the hypothesis of tax 
competition relies on a key parameter which describes how a government unit’s tax 
rate changes in response to a change in its competitors’ tax rate (Bartik 1991). Most 
often this parameter has been estimated based on a rather stringent assumption that all 
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the units in the sample share the same responsiveness, and therefore has failed to 
reflect the intrinsic heterogeneity of competition incentives. Another problem with this 
method that has yet to be solved is that it tends to reject the hypothesis of competition 
when it actually should not, especially when only a few of the governments in the 
sample have significant tax competition behaviors. The approach we adopt for 
avoiding the specification bias is the local indicators of spatial association (LISA), 
also called local Moran’s I, which was originally developed by Anselin (1995) and 
studied by Bao and Henry (1996) and many others. In our definition, the localized tax 
rate correlation coefficient ρi is estimated by using an extended version of local 
Moran’s I  
 
* *
1 1 0 0
* 2
1 1
( ) ( )
ˆ ,
( ) /
i ik kk
i
ii
t t w t t
t t n
ρ − −= −
∑
∑  (4.7) 
where the subscripts 1 and 0 represent the current and last year respectively, ti is the 
observed value of t at location i, t* is the mean of t, wik is the spatial weight between i 
and k, and n is the number of observed units. This localized statistic fits into our 
research for several reasons. First, it is conveniently computable even by using a 
cross-sectional data set. Second, it has direct and rich implications for the spatial 
distribution of data. A positive value of iρˆ  indicates a positive correlation. Given this 
result, if t1i is also greater than t1*, then high values are located near to each other; 
otherwise, low values are clustered. On the other hand, a negative value of iρˆ  
indicates a negative spatial autocorrelation. Depending on whether t1i exceeds t1* , a 
pattern of the spatial outlier can be determined as either a high valued unit in contrast 
to low valued neighbors or the opposite. Third, this statistic reflects the relationship 
between unit i’s tax rate and the lagged tax rates of its neighbors. This is a device that 
enables us to avoid a serious endogeneity problem, caused by the simultaneity of 
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neighboring units’ tax rate setting behaviors. Reasonably speaking, we assume that the 
lagged tax rates of neighbors are exogenous to unit i’s current tax rate. 
It is worth noting that the statistical test for the significance of local Moran’s I 
should be implemented with great caution. As shown by Anselin and many others, 
when the sample size is relatively small, the asymmetric distribution of Ii deviates 
away from normal, suggesting that a distribution-based test is largely unreliable. In 
this chapter, we follow the suggestion of Anselin (1995) to take a conditional 
randomization or permutation approach (as described on page 96, Anselin 1995) to 
calculate pseudo significance levels. 
Another important concern for estimating the tax rate correlation is about how to 
define competitors. In this chapter, we consider the geographic proximity as the 
primary standard in the definition of competitors. The study units of this chapter are 
rural counties in China, which are the smallest administrative unit to have local 
autonomy of fiscal policies. Its size also makes it vulnerable to the influence of its 
geographic neighbors. In addition, there are several theoretical arguments to explain 
that geographical proximity matters for capital tax competition. If a business was 
planning to set up in a certain jurisdiction in order to minimize transportation cost to 
its consumers, only jurisdictions within a small distance could be viewed as good 
substitutes for such a business. From the information cost point of view, small-sized 
governments are better informed of the tax policies imposed by their neighbors than 
by others located at a distance. An extreme case of information-induced tax 
competition is the yardstick competition, illustrated by Besley and Case (1995), which 
reveals that local units, even without the constraint of capital mobility, tend to mimic 
their neighbors’ tax policies because officials are disciplined by voters who use 
neighboring units as benchmarks to judge local achievement. 
  
82 
In the spatial econometrics literature, there is no consensus about how to define 
geographic neighbors. Several choices, as reviewed by Brett and Pinkse (2000), 
include the common boundary neighbors, great-circle neighbors and nearest-distance 
neighbors. Since our results are generally robust to any of these measures, the rest of 
this chapter will focus on the ‘four-nearest’ neighbor concept under which unit j is a 
neighbor of i if it is one of the four closest units to i. Applying this concept, we can 
test a spatial tax competition hypothesis that a county unit i’s tax rate is positively 
affected by the tax rate of its geographic neighbors. This conclusion is particularly 
consistent with the perfect competition model.  
4.3 The existence and pattern of tax competition behaviors   
4.3.1 Data   
To provide a broad view of intergovernmental competition behaviors among 
grassroots administration units, we construct a panel dataset, consisting of 2094 rural 
counties and county level municipalities in the period from 1993 to 2005. Our sample 
covers all the rural counties as of 1993 except a small portion with missing tax or 
income information. Technically, we have employed two procedures to ensure the 
temporal and spatial consistency of the dataset. First, considering that in almost every 
year some county units have experienced boundary changes either by merging or 
splitting, the data after 1993 have been aggregated to match the county definition as of 
1993 so that the analytical outcome will be comparable intertemporally.  Second, in 
order to combine the economic and geographic data, we create a geocoding system 
which links the records of various years to the county-level base map at the end of 
1993, which is derived from a 1990 China county-level administration map (provided 
by CITAS) by utilizing publications on administrative coverage changes posted on the 
website of the Ministry of Civil Affairs.  
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Figure 4.1 Dynamic patterns of county-level tax rates: GINI and mean in the 
nation 
As a measure of tax burdens on capital investment, we follow the method used in 
Knight (2002) to calculate the effective tax rate by first adding up all the taxes 
imposed on firms or business, and then dividing by the non-agriculture GDP, a proxy 
for the tax base.13 The numerator includes two types of locally-sourced taxes: VAT 
and business taxes. For these two tax revenues, shared between the local and the 
central governments, only the proportion of the actual collection that eventually 
belong to local control—usually 25 percent— are included in our calculation. Since in 
rural areas these taxes are mostly borne by non-agricultural production or services, we 
partition the GDP between agriculture and non-agriculture in proportion to the 
magnitudes of the county-specific gross value of industrial output (GVIO) and gross 
value of agriculture output (GVAO), and use non-agriculture GDP to approximate the 
tax base of capital stock.  
 As presented in Figure 4.1, the county- level tax rates for capital vary 
remarkably across the nation. The Gini coefficient rose to 0.73 in 1994 and slowly 
decreased to 0.57 from 1996 to 2000. In the period between 2001 and 2005, this 
                                                 
13 The computation of GDP in the period of 1993-1996 is based on a linear approximation method, 
which is explained in Yao (2006).  
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coefficient stabilized at an even lower level around 0.36. In a similar pattern, the 
nationwide average effective tax rate has continued decreasing at an annual rate of 
9.08% since 1994. The fact that both the mean and variation of the tax rate for capital 
decreased in the rural area seems to suggest a converging trend toward the bottom. 
Even so, the trend at the global is still likely to disagree with some local trends, in 
light of the sizable variation in county level tax rates.  
4.3.2  Identification of local spatial tax competition  
  To lessen the impact of autocorrelation at the temporal dimension, we take six 
discontinued years to examine spatial tax competition: 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 
and 2004. Counties are assumed to take into account their neighbors’ tax rates in the 
previous year and neglect the potential impact that their own choices may impose on 
their neighbors’ future choices. Using Geoda, the spatial analysis software developed 
by Luc Anselin, we calculate local Moran’s I, defined by equation (4.7), and its p-
value for each county unit year by year. The estimates not only indicate which unit’s 
tax choice is significantly related to its spatial neighbors’, but also enable us to further 
classify the units with significant correlated tax choices into four tax strategy groups14: 
high-high (the description before the hyphen refers to unit i and the one after the 
hyphen refers to its neighbors), low-low, low-high and high-low tax rate clusters. 
Among them, the clusters of low tax rates identify the counties in a race to the bottom; 
the clusters of high tax rates are the counties in a race to the top; and the clusters of 
dissimilar values are spatial outliers, contradicting the spatial tax competition 
hypothesis. 
In Figure 4.2, we compare the national distribution of tax competition strategy 
choices in 1994 and 2004. In both years, the majority of the sample counties, 70.2%  
                                                 
14 The significance level is 5%. Our results in subsequent sections are robust to other significance levels 
such as 10%.  
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Note: relative frequency labeled above the bar and expressed in percentages. 
Figure 4.2 Tax strategy distribution among 2094 rural counties in China 
 
and 63.8% for 1994 and 2004 respectively, did not yield significant tax rate 
correlation, implying that local tax rate decision is not responsive to the decision of 
spatial neighbors. On the other hand, out of the 1994 sample, there were 25.0% with a 
significant spatial clustering of low tax rates, 2.4% with a significant clustering of high 
tax rates and 2.4% with a clustering of dissimilar tax rates. Comparison between the 
two years reveals an interesting trend toward more counties in a ‘race to the top’ and 
fewer counties in a ‘race to the bottom’, as the percentage of H-H units increased to 
9.7%, and the percentage of L-L units decreased to 23.3% in 2004.  
What causes the sharp difference in counties tax competition behaviors? In this 
chapter, we investigate three factors: regional or provincial location, time, and 
relationship between competitors’ endowments.   
4.3.3  Spatial and temporal changes 
Table 4.1 reports how counties with different tax competition strategies were 
  
 
86 
  Table 4.1 Distribution of tax competition strategies in the nation, regions and endowment clustering groups 
 observation  H-H  L-L  L-H  H-L  No response 
  1994 2004   1994 2004   1994 2004   1994 2004   1994 2004   1994 2004 
Nation 2094 2094  51 202  524 487  29 55  21 15  1469 1335 
                  
Coastal 647 647  2 30  301 233  1 11  10 5  333 368 
Inland 1447 1447  49 172  223 254  28 44  11 10  1136 967 
                  
E1 (H-H) 175 215  0 27  106 59  0 5  1 1  68 123 
E2 (L-L) 484 502  29 71  9 47  7 14  1 3  438 367 
E3 (L-H) 33 22  0 2  11 1  0 0  0 1  22 18 
E4 (H-L) 10 21  1 2  1 3  0 7  0 0  8 9 
E0 (No GDP correlation) 1392 1334   21 100   397 377   22 29   19 10   933 818 
Note: numbers indicate frequency. 
  Table 4.2 The chi-square test of independence for tax competition choices and spatial location variables 
(1) Provinces   (2) Regions   (3) Endowment Clusters Year 
D.F. χ2 P value   D.F. χ2 P value   D.F. χ2 P value 
1994 120 2500 0.000  4 249.8927 0.000  16 292.77 0.000 
1996 120 2700 0.000  4 257.4119 0.000  16 382.40 0.000 
1998 120 2400 0.000  4 173.1465 0.000  16 539.90 0.000 
2000 120 2000 0.000  4 121.6528 0.000  16 332.44 0.000 
2002 120 1900 0.000  4 45.2078 0.000  16 154.19 0.000 
2004 120 1600 0.000   4 99.9056 0.000   16 174.74 0.000 
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distributed in coastal and inland areas15. It is observed, for instance, that in 1994, 
301of 524 clusters of low tax rates were located in the eastern coastal areas and 
accounted for 46.1 percent of coastal counties, while 49 of 51 clusters of high tax rates 
in the western inland areas. Generally speaking, Table 4.1suggests that the regional 
location—for example whether the county is located in a certain province or a 
region—can affect its tax competition strategy. We examine the provincial and 
regional effect by applying the Chi-square test for a pair of categorical variables, 
which hypothesizes that one categorical variable, the tax strategy choice, is 
independent of the other categorical variable, provincial or regional location. The 
results, as reported in the first two columns of Table 4.2, suggest that the hypothesis of 
no provincial and regional effect is not significantly supported by our data. The 
conclusion is robust across various years.  
When it comes to the temporal effect, we conduct a number of pair wise chi-
square tests for the differences in the distributions of tax competition strategy choices 
between the two different years. The test results all indicate the same significant 
temporal changes. 
4.3.4 Endowments  
Here, the concept of endowment is defined in a general term, which can reflect a 
combination of economic development levels, capital stocks, natural resource 
endowment, and labor skills. Although a further breakdown into different classes of 
endowments may reveal more interesting and reasonable behaviors, the lack of data at 
the county level only allows us to use per capita GDP as a proxy for general 
endowments. It is hypothesized that whether a county unit and its representative 
                                                 
15 Following the convention of China’s Statistic Bureau, the coastal region includes Beijing, Tianjin, 
Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan. 
The inland region includes the rest nineteen provinces. As shown in Table 1, our sample includes 647 
coastal counties and 1447 inland counties. 
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competitor have large and closely related GDP, small and closely related GDP, or 
extremely different GDP level will affect their choice among the five tax competition 
strategies.      
Similar to Section 4.3.2, four groups of significant spatial clusters as well as a 
group of insignificant ones are identified for county-level economic endowments, 
measured by real per capita GDP. The spatial clusters of economic endowments are 
examined in a different set of years, including 1993, 1995, 1997, 2001 and 2003, 
which are one year ahead of those used in the tax competition analysis. It is worth 
noting that endowments and tax rates are studied in different periods. The purpose of 
using per capital GDP (as a proxy for endowment) in preceding years is to reduce the 
causal impact of tax rate on it. For simplicity, endowment clusters will be labeled in 
accordance with the tax year in the rest of this chapter.   
It is observed that the clusters of high economic achievements mainly showed up 
in coastal areas, and clusters of low economic achievements largely concentrated in 
western and central areas. In 1994, L-L GDP clusters accounted for 23.1% of the 
population, while H-H GDP clusters only 8.3%. Moreover, 87.4% of H-H clusters 
were in coastal region, while 85.9% of L-L clusters in inland. The percentages did not 
change much in 2004. However, it is worth noting that the proportion of the 
population that exhibited a significant and positive spatial correlation in GDP rose 
continuously in the study period, increasing from 31.4% in 1994 to 34.2% by 2004. 
One implication that we can derive from these results is that these counties, either 
explicitly or implicitly, should have connections to the neighborhood strong enough to 
trigger economic convergence at the local level.   
        The majority, however, does not possess such a strong connection to their 
neighbors. There are 66.5 and 63.7 percent of the population, in 1994 and 2004 
respectively, not significantly correlated to their neighbors’ economic development. A 
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small portion, on the other hand, was found to exhibit a significant and negative 
correlation to their spatial neighbors in terms of economic development. Their share in 
total population was 2.06% in 1994 and varied little afterward (its standard variation 
was 0.001 from 1994 to 2004). 
 To test the null hypothesis in which spatial tax rate competition is free of 
influence from endowment clusters, we construct frequency tables for each tax year 
using the endowment cluster type as the row category variable and the tax rate cluster 
type as the column category variable, and apply the chi-square test to see if there is a 
dependent relationship between the two category variables. The last five rows in Table 
4.1 present the frequency tables in 1994 and 2004, indicating that the tax competition 
choices are distributed in substantially different patterns among different endowment 
clusters. The results of chi-square tests, as shown in column (3) of Table 4.2, also 
suggest that the hypothesis of independence should be rejected, therefore supporting 
the presence of a statistically significant endowment cluster effect. 
 
4.4 The choice model of tax competition strategy   
In this section, we adopt a multinomial logistic regression approach to examine 
the factors that underlie the variation of tax rate competition behaviors. From a game 
theory perspective, the five types of tax rate clusters that have been identified in 
section 4.3.2 reflect five potential equilibriums as to how the county government 
chooses the optimal tax rate strategy in response to its spatial neighbors’ tax choices. 
Suppose the five types of equilibriums are exhaustive in the game outcome domain. 
Let πij denote the probability for unit i to choose the jth strategy so that πi0+ πi1 + πi2 + 
πi3 + πi4 = 1, where j equals 0, 1,…or 4. The probabilities are estimated by using a 
logistic density function, which is described as follows 
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where yi is the choice variable for unit i and Vij is a linear combination of variables that 
explain choice j.  
As for the determinant factors in the choice decisions, Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 
provide strong evidence for the regional, temporal, and endowment effects. Although 
being straightforward, the tests before this section share a common shortcoming in that 
they do not allow for more than one explainable variable to be taken into account. The 
regression approach will include all these variables to explain the choices of tax 
strategies so that it is able to sort out how each factor affects the unit’s choice among 
the five competition behaviors given that other factors have been controlled for. 
Therefore, to fit in our data, we use the following specification: 
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where subscripts i and j denote observation and choice category respectively; k 
denotes the endowment category; βj, γj, δj and φj represent choice-specific coefficients, 
and εij represents the disturbance term associated with choice j. The explanatory 
variables include dummy variables for the endowment cluster types, denoted by Ek, a 
dummy variable for the coastal region, denoted by R, and a vector of dummy variables 
for various years, T.           
In addition, also included in equation (4.9) is a vector of other economic 
variables, X, which comprises agriculture share in GDP (AGSH) and share of the 
population that is employed or financially supported by local governments 
(GEPOPSH), measures for industrial structure and government fiscal burden 
respectively. Table 4.3 summarizes the means and standard deviations for all the 
variables to be used in the estimation. In regard to these two new variables, it shows  
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Table 4.3 Summaries for tax strategy choices and the explanatory variables 
  Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
Y=H-H Dummy for the H-H tax cluster  0.052 0.222 
Y=L-L Dummy for the L-L tax cluster  0.245 0.430 
Y=L-H Dummy for the L-H tax cluster  0.016 0.125 
Y=H-L Dummy for the H-L tax cluster  0.008 0.091 
Y=insignificant correlation No tax rate correlation 0.679 0.467 
    
Explanatory Variables    
E1 (H-H) 
Dummy for the H-H endowment 
cluster  0.106 0.308 
E2 (L-L) 
Dummy for the L-L endowment 
cluster  0.236 0.424 
E3 (L-H) 
Dummy for the H-L endowment 
cluster  0.010 0.100 
E4 (H-L) 
Dummy for the L-H endowment 
cluster  0.009 0.092 
E0 (insignificant 
correlation) No endowment clustering 0.639 0.480 
    
Coastal Dummy for the coastal region 0.309 0.462 
    
year=1994 (or any other) Dummy for a specific tax year 0.167 0.373 
    
AGSH Agricultural share in GDP 0.408 0.225 
GEPOPSH 
Share of the population that are 
employed or financially supported 
by local governments 0.033 0.023 
 
that as an average of the six tax years, the agricultural sector accounted for 40.8 
percent of the total GDP in rural counties, and out of every 100 residents, about 3 
worked for the governments or depended on local fiscal funding.  
 We adopt a maximum likelihood method to estimate the tax strategy choice 
equations and report the results in Table 4.4. In each determination equation, we report 
the exponentiated coefficients, which have an informative interpretation of relative 
risk ratios (RRR)16 — the ratio of the relative risk for a one-unit increase in the 
explanatory variable x to the relative risk when x is unchanged. The RRRs are relative 
                                                 
16 Gould (2000) provides a definition for RRR used in the STATA environment. It is expressed as  
)/(/)/1(
)1/(/)1/1(
xcategorybaseyPxyP
xcategorybaseyPxyPRRR ==
+=+== . 
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to the base category, here corresponding to the no-response-to-neighbors strategy, 
which is indicated by insignificant tax rate correlations. In such a setting, we focus on 
how the unit-specific factors affect their preference for an active tax rate reaction 
strategy in comparison with the passive no-response strategy. It can be exactly 
captured by RRR. For instance, if an explanatory variable came with a RRR greater 
than one, then a marginal increase in this variable would make the associated choice 
more preferable than the base category choice. 
  Table 4.4 includes two models with or without AGSH and GEPOPSH. 
Compared with Model (1), which excludes the two variables, Model (2) significantly 
improves the estimation efficiency by reducing the AIC statistic from 18,559 to 
16,270 and increasing the log likelihood ratio from -9,235 to -8,083.  This suggests 
that including these economic variables gives a better fit to our data Even so, there are 
no extreme changes in the estimated effects for endowments, coastal location and time 
between these two models. Most variables that are significant in model (1) still have a 
significant effect in model (2), while a few dummies for years become significant in 
model (2) though not in model (1). In terms of magnitude, no change as the result of 
adding the new variables is large enough to convert the implication for influence 
directions, as it is observed that no RRR estimate above one falls below one or vice 
versa. For instance, in the H-H tax rate strategy equation, the RRR of the L-L GDP 
cluster declines from 2.71 in model (1) to 1.63 in model (2). In spite of the magnitude 
difference, both of them being greater than one suggest that a switch into the L-L GDP 
cluster generally causes a county to prefer more to the H-H tax rate strategy than the 
no-response strategy. Because of the above reasons, we focus on model (2) to discuss 
the implications of tax competition behaviors. 
As indicated by the first column in model (2), several variables, H-H, L-L and H-
L GDP clusters, AGSH and GEPOPSH, significantly increase the relative risk 
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  Table 4.4 Multinomial logistic estimates for the tax strategy choice 
                   
 (1)  (2) 
  Y=H-H Y=L-L Y=L-H Y=H-L  Y=H-H Y=L-L Y=L-H Y=H-L 
          
E1 (H-H) 3.40 1.83 2.56 3.79  7.67 1.23 3.22 4.82 
 ( 0.000**) ( 0.000**) ( 0.005**) ( 0.000**)  ( 0.000**) (0.005**) (0.001**) ( 0.000**) 
E2 (L-L) 2.71 0.11 2.50 0.27  1.63 0.15 2.40 0.23 
 ( 0.000**) ( 0.000**) ( 0.000**) (0.006**)  ( 0.000**) ( 0.000**) ( 0.000**) (0.002**) 
E3 (L-H) 1.02 0.75 0.00 2.95  0.67 0.67 0.00 2.96 
 (0.98) (0.14) ( 0.000**) (0.14)  (0.58) (0.07) (1.00) (0.14) 
E4 (H-L) 1.98 0.20 8.22 0.00  4.12 0.14 10.58 0.00 
 (0.10) ( 0.000** ) ( 0.000** ) ( 0.000**)  (0.004**) ( 0.000** ) ( 0.000**) (1.00) 
          
Coastal 0.18 1.85 0.46 1.37  0.31 1.46 0.66 1.30 
 ( 0.000** ) ( 0.000** ) (0.003**) (0.23)  ( 0.000** ) ( 0.000** ) (0.13) (0.37) 
          
AGSH      1761.09 0.08 4.71 5.84 
      ( 0.000**) ( 0.000**) ( 0.000**) (0.032*) 
GEPOPSH      1.2E+11 0.00 1.9E+11 0.00 
      ( 0.000**) ( 0.000**) ( 0.000**) (0.41) 
          
Observation  12564  12564 
AIC*n 18559.945  16270.685 
Log 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
-9235.972 
  
-8083.343 
Notes: (1) year dummies omitted. 
            (2) p values in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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(preference) for the choice of the H-H tax strategy over the base choice. Among them, 
the estimates for AGSH and GEPOPSH both take remarkably large values, implying 
that the change in the relative preference is extremely sensitive to even a marginal 
change in one of these variables. The only variable significantly depressing the 
preference for the H-H tax strategy over the no-response strategy is coastal dummy, 
with an estimated RRR of 0.31. 
It is more enlightening to compare the first two columns in model (2). On the one 
hand, all the variables that increase the relative preference for the H-H tax strategy 
significantly lower the relative preference to the L-L tax strategy except for the H-H 
GDP cluster. On the other hand, the variables that significantly raise the relative 
preference for the L-L tax strategy also include those that lower the relative preference 
for the H-H tax strategy. Examples are the L-L GDP cluster and coastal region 
dummy, respectively. Simply put, the first group of variables particularly supports the 
H-H tax rate competition but does not support L-L tax rate competition; the second 
group behaves in a converse manner. A noteworthy variable is the H-H GDP cluster, 
whose RRR estimate is greater than 1 in both H-H and L-L tax strategy functions, 
suggesting that both tax strategies are preferable over no-response for the counties in 
this endowment cluster. But which of the two strategies would be more preferable for 
the H-H GDP cluster?  
 To make this point clear, we rerun the multinomial logistic regression using the 
H-H tax competition strategy as the basic choice. Table 4.5 reports the results for three 
different periods: 1994-2004, 1994-2002, and 200417, from which we find a striking 
difference in behaviors of H-H GDP clusters in the two sub-periods. Unlike in the  
                                                 
17 Splitting the population into two sub-periods has two reasons. Firstly, in the equation of H-H tax 
strategy, the estimate for the year dummy of 2004 takes extremely large value but the estimates for 
other years don’t. Secondly, a chi-square test for the hypothesis of identical coefficients in the two 
periods strongly supports rejection of the hypothesis. 
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Table 4.5 Tests for factors that support choosing the L-L  
over H-H tax strategies 
 1994-2004  1994-2002  2004  
Variable 
RRR(L-L 
vs. H-H) P-value   
RRR(L-L 
vs. H-H) P-value   
RRR(L-L 
vs. H-H) P-value 
         
E1 (H-H) 0.159 0.000  4.412 0.230  0.129 0.000 
         
E2 (L-L) 0.089 0.000  0.051 0.000  0.284 0.000 
         
E3 (L-H) 1.001 0.999  1.024 0.991  0.137 0.117 
         
E4 (H-L) 0.034 0.000  0.015 0.000  0.320 0.229 
         
Coastal 4.707 0.000  3.0E+09 0.000  5.112 0.000 
         
AGSH 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.054 0.000 
         
GEPOPSH 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
                  
 
period between 1994 and 2002, when they preferred L-L tax strategy to H-H tax 
strategy ( as indicated by a RRR estimate of 4.41), the H-H GDP clusters changed to 
like H-H tax strategy more than L-L tax strategy in 2004 (RRR estimate drops to 
0.13).       
 According to Table 4.5, the H-H GDP cluster was a stark contrast to the L-L 
GDP cluster during 1994-2002: the H-H GDP cluster belongs to the group supporting 
the L-L competition behaviors, while the L-L GDP cluster belongs to the other. This 
implies that the racing-to-the-bottom tax behaviors largely apply to homogeneous 
competitors with relatively large endowments, rather than all the homogeneous 
competitors. More importantly, this also implies that the existence of homogeneous 
competitors with small endowments seems to constitute one of the driving forces 
behind the emergence of races to the top, indicating that they might have a penchant 
for high tax rates over capital inflows. 
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In 2004, however, the H-H GDP cluster fell into the same tax strategy preference 
as the L-L GDP cluster did. The reason why spatial neighbors with rich endowments 
would take the risk of losing relatively huge size of tax base by switching to prefer a 
race to the top, and the reason why the change took place in 2004 are still uncertain. 
Due to lack of relevant data, we are unable to provide rigorous interpretation for this 
phenomenon.  It is likely “the race to the top” in rich areas to be a short-term response 
to the implementation of a new fiscal reform “export VAT rebate sharing scheme”, 
which was announced in the early of 2003 and effective since January 1, 2004. As the 
most important feature of the new scheme, the local government, who used to pay 
nothing for export VAT rebate, is requested to shoulder a responsibility of 25 percent 
of the increment above the export VAT rebate in 2003. Considering the fact that most 
rich rural counties in China are located in coastal area and highly dependent on export-
oriented industries, this export rebate reform, therefore, would have affected them 
much more greatly than the poor ones. From strategic economics’ point of view, the 
policy may distort the rich counties’ tax behaviors in two ways. Firstly, as expecting 
2003’s export VAT would serve as a deductible basis for locally financed rebate in all 
the years to follow, local governments would intentionally raise effort to enlarge the 
size of VAT in local export industries. Secondly, the newly-added burden to finance 
export rebates would constrain local governments with relatively large export industry 
from engaging in tax reduction competition. As a consequence, rich clusters are likely 
to raise VAT both in 2003 and 2004, leading to a seemingly changed taste for H-H tax 
rate competition.           
 Also shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, both AGSH and GEPOPSH are in the 
club of factors that induce the H-H-competition behaviors. Figure 4.3 (a) and (b) 
depict how the increase in AGSH affects the probability of choosing the H-H and L-L 
tax competition for the H-H and L-L GDP clusters in the period of 1994-2002. In  
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(a)  The impact on choosing H-H tax strategy 
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(b)  The impact on choosing L-L tax strategy 
Note: All the other explanatory variables at means. 
Figure 4.3 The impact of agriculture share in GDP on tax competition behaviors 
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Note: All the other explanatory variables at means. 
Figure 4.4 The impact of government employment size on  
tax competition behaviors 
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general, no matter whether a county belongs to H-H GDP clusters or L-L GDP 
clusters, a rise in the agriculture share of GDP increases its probability of choosing the 
H-H tax competition, but decreases its probability of choosing the L-L tax 
competition. In a striking threshold pattern, both the H-H competition probability 
curves, though remaining flat at zero until the agriculture share in GDP reaches 60%, 
begin to rise steeply afterward. This suggests that counties that have reached certain 
industrialization degree tend to care more about capital flow and dislike the option of 
the H-H tax competition, even when they are in a cluster of poor endowments. Also 
observed in Figure 4.3 , the curve for L-L GDP clusters takes a steeper slope than that 
for H-H GDP clusters in (a), but a less steep slope in (b). This indicates a substantial 
difference in economic structure effect on different GDP clusters. The impact of 
GEPOPSH on the probability of choosing H-H and L-L tax competition behaviors, as 
shown in Figure 4.4, is similar to that of AGSH except that the probability curves for 
L-L tax competition behaviors (See Figure 4.4 (b)) exhibit a threshold pattern in which 
a government employee share greater than 0.09 would prevent both clusters from 
taking part in L-L tax competition.  
 Last but not the least, it is surprising to find, in the last two columns in model 
(2), that the homogeneous GDP clusters also have substantially higher propensity to 
choose dissimilar tax rates than the base group. What drives the similarly situated 
competitors to adopt diverging tax decisions is a question that we are unable to 
empirically sort out with the current data set in which the observations for 
heterogeneous tax rate strategies are too few.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In order to provide explanations for the spatial patterns of localized tax rate 
correlations, this chapter has developed an empirical approach combining a state-of-
the-art geographic statistical method, LISA, and a sequence of rigorous statistical 
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tests. The approach emphasizes the possibility of heterogeneous local behaviors by 
allowing for an estimation of spatial tax rate correlations at every individual location. 
As most studies in the empirical literature of tax competition, we take into account the 
nearest neighborhood effect of local tax rate determination. Applying LISA to our 
data, we find strong evidence for spatial clustering of tax rates in some regions, but 
weak or no tax competition in others. In particular, the relationships between 
neighboring tax rates are found to vary across five distinct groups. These results 
conform to our intuition that tax competition behaviors are not globally uniform.  
In the second step of the empirical study, we examine the determinants of 
location specific competition behaviors. The regional effect is statistically significant, 
either in a univariate or multivariate model. The other factor, probably of greater 
importance, is the relationship of endowments between competitors. As suggested by 
theories, the different endowment levels can trigger strategic tax rate settings rather 
than a unique equilibrium. According to our results, the tax competition behaviors not 
only differ between symmetrically endowed units and asymmetrically endowed units, 
but also differ between symmetric units at different endowment levels. In a rather long 
period of 1994-2002, the clustered rich units were in a competition to reduce tax rates, 
while the clustered poor units in a competition to raise tax rates.  
Although few theoretical studies to date have recognized, let alone interpreted, 
the ‘race to the top’ behaviors among poor counties, these behaviors can be reasonably 
explained by several simple intuitions. First of all, in China, poor counties are faced 
with much tighter budget constraints than rich counties, so the pressure to self-finance 
the basic spending needs probably has prevented them from taking active actions on 
tax reduction. Instead of creating enabling investment environments, the poor counties 
may be involved in predatory tax practices against the industrial and business sectors. 
To a large extent, the fixed cost to run a local government is rather similar across 
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regions. Under fiscal decentralization, the burden to finance the fixed cost compared 
to local revenue bases in the poor regions is heavier than that in the rich regions. As 
shown in Zhang (2006), the rigid governance structure coupled with fiscal 
decentralization forces force some local governments in the lagging regions to impose 
higher average tax rates on capital investment. 
Second, it is inevitable that regions comprised of poor counties in clusters are 
likely to encounter poorly-maintained public facilities, under-educated labors and 
weak consumption demand. The adverse investment environment in the neighborhood 
can exert a negative externality on the business development for every single county 
within the region, thereby discouraging these counties from being involved in capital 
competition. Last but not least, because the intergovernmental transfer policies in 
general favor regions with lower revenue capacity (Yao 2006), poor counties may 
devote more of their energies in securing central transfers instead of engaging in tax 
rate reduction, even though the latter is expected to induce more direct investment and 
boost fiscal capacity in the long run.  Such a choice can be prevalent among local 
governments who expect that a rise in tax rate can lead to smaller size of local revenue 
in the near future.  
The divergent behaviors between rich and poor counties might have important 
implications for development policies. The higher tax rate in the poor counties will 
prevent them from attracting more capital investment, which in turn will further widen 
the gap with the rich counties in the coast. At this point, our finding supports the 
theoretical predictions in Cai and Treisman (2005).  In addition to endowment effect, 
we also find that government fiscal burden also matters to the tax competition 
behavior. Therefore the central and provincial governments that attempt to unleash 
competitive incentives within the poor regions should also consider reforming the 
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governance structure and subsidizing the fixed cost of running a government in the 
poor areas. 
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